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A PAGE OF HISTORY OR A VOLUME OF LOGIC?:
REASSESSING THE SUPREME COURT'S ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
"History is a voice forever sounding across the centuries the laws of
right and wrong. Opinions alter, manners change, creeds rise and
fall, but the moral law is written on the tablets of eternity."-Froude
"History is bunk. "-Henry Ford
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Holmes once said, "A page of history is worth a volume of log-
ic."' Nowhere does that sentiment ring more true than in the context of dis-
cerning the proper scope of the Establishment Clause. Unfortunately, since
1947 the Supreme Court has severed the Clause from its historical roots, aban-
doning the lessons of its poignant historical experiences. The result has proved
catastrophic, as the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence seems to shift,
sometimes drastically, with every personnel change on the Court.2 Nonethe-
less, history may be as poor a barometer of the Clause's intended scope as are
the Court's inconsistent decisions. Indeed, the history of the Establishment
Clause is not only confusing, but mired in minutiae and readily manipulated.
Unwary jurists consistently fall prey to its simple deceptiveness and overlook
its unquantifiable complexity. The ominous result is an Establishment Clause
jurisprudence which is one-sided and distorted, a jurisprudence without sub-
stance and historical support.
The Establishment Clause prohibits Congress from making any law "re-
specting an establishment of religion."3 Although the plain language of the
Clause would seem to indicate that it proscribed only establishments as they
were commonly known to the Framers, i.e., legislative designation of an offi-
cial state church, courts have read much into the term "respecting" and con-
cluded the Clause's reach is broader than its face suggests.4 Engaged in an
inherent (and necessary) conflict with the Establishment Clause is the Free
Exercise Clause, which forbids Congress from enacting any law prohibiting
the free exercise of religion.5
1. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
2. For an example, see infra notes 422-26, 440 and accompanying text, which discuss the
impact of Justice O'Connor upon the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. For an argument suggesting that the plain language approach has been incorrectly and
without explanation rejected, see William C. Porth & Robert P. George, Trimming the Ivy: A
Bicentennial Re-Examination of the Establishment Clause, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 109 (1987).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. i. One author argues that the Religion Clauses "must be construed
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Given the breadth and generality of the Clause's language, it is not sur-
prising that many interpretations have been proffered. Nonetheless, most histo-
rians and jurists generally adopt one of two views: separationism or
nonpreferentialism.6 Separationism, which is the view most often espoused by
the Supreme Court, advocates, as its name suggests, strict separation between
church and state. 7 Separationists allege that the Constitution and the Establish-
ment Clause prohibit any and all federal government aid to religion.! The
competing view of nonpreferentialism in essence proffers that the Framers
intended the Establishment Clause to prohibit only congressional establishment
of a national church and elevation of one religious sect to a preferred status
over other sects.9 Hence, nonpreferentialism permits government support for
religion provided no religions or religious sects are excluded from receipt of
the benefit."
This article begins with a brief overview of the Establishment Clause's
adoption and the writings of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, the two
figureheads upon which the Supreme Court most regularly relies to support its
decisions and its endorsement of separationism. Specifically, the article exam-
ines Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance and Jefferson's Danbury letter
and Virginia Bill for Religious Freedom. Following this discussion, the article
briefly outlines the rise of the Lemon test, the traditional standard developed
by the Court to resolve Establishment Clause disputes. It then traces the Su-
preme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence and examines its two most
recent pronouncements: Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of
Virginia" and Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette.2 Final-
ly, the article evaluates the merits and historical accuracy of the Court's Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence. In this respect, it concludes that the Court's
decisions in this area, and the test on which those decisions are based, are rid-
dled with historical inaccuracies. These inaccuracies include the Court's gross
overemphasis on, and misunderstanding of, the individual church-state view-
points of both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. 3 Not only has the
as never in contradiction." Carl H. Esbeck, A Restatement of the Supreme Court's Law of Reli-
gious Freedom: Coherence, Conflict, or Chaos?, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 581, 594 (1995). This
assertion ignores, however, that the Clauses frequently must be in conflict-they protect different
interests and seek conflicting objectives. The Establishment Clause limits the state's involvement
in religion while the Free Exercise Clause protects religious expression. Therefore, whenever reli-
gious expression is curtailed by the Establishment Clause, the two are in contradiction.
6. For an interesting debate regarding the merits of each view, see Robert L. Cord &
Howard Ball, The Separation of Church and State: A Debate, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 895.
7. Note that even the Court has not gone so far as to say all aid, even that which is inci-
dental, is restricted. As will be shown, however, the Court's tendencies have historically leaned far
more to the separationist side than any other.
8. ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CUR-
RENT FICTION 19 (1982).
9. LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 112-13 (1994).
10. For an interesting historical overview of the tension between nonpreferentialists and
strict-separationists, see John Witte, Jr., The Theology and Politics of the First Amendment Reli-
gion Clauses: A Bicentennial Essay, 40 EMORY L.J. 489 (1991).
11. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
12. 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).
13. For discussions of Madison and Jefferson, see infra notes 40-63, 462-94 and
accompanying text.
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Court characterized Jefferson and Madison as indisputably separationist, it has
further attributed their views to every Framer of the Bill of Rights and found
the concept of separationism to be inherent in the Clause itself. 4 As such, the
Court has ignored and belittled the views of virtually every person involved in
the framing of the Establishment Clause. The Court further ignored history
when it incorporated the Clause and subsequently applied it to the states via
the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 This incorporation dramatically altered the fed-
eralist structure the Framer's intended to inhere in the Clause and has resulted
in chaos, as the Court has been forced to engage in a number of roles for
which it is ill-suited. These roles include Court micromanagement of religious
issues in public schools, 6 Court decisions as to the amount and types of aid
states may render to private religious schools, 7 and a host of other local and
regional issues the Framers intended the states, rather than the national govern-
ment, to resolve. As such, this author posits that the Court should return the
vast majority of those decisions to the states, and allow local citizens to make
these delicate and sensitive determinations."
II. ADOPTING THE AMENDMENT
It was to fulfill a campaign promise that Madison stood on June 8, 1789,
to address the First Congress and introduce preliminary versions of the Reli-
gion Clauses.' His first proposal read: "The civil rights of none shall be
abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national
religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in
any manner, or on any pretext, infringed."2" Not to be hurried, the House
referred Madison's proposals to committee, where they remained until the
House debates of August 15.2 During this time, the committee, which includ-
ed Madison, altered the amendment to read as follows: "No religion shall be
established by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed."22
The rewording was not complete, however, for, again on August 15, the
House adopted by a 31-20 vote a version stating, "Congress shall make no
laws touching religion, or infringing the rights of conscience., 23 The final
changes came on August 20, when the House at long last settled on the fol-
lowing wording and submitted this amendment to the Senate: "Congress shall
14. See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion and critique of this incorporation, see infra notes 77-78, 508-28 and
accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the public education cases, see infra notes 170-275 and accompany-
ing text; for a critique of those decisions, see infra notes 449-61 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the aid to parochial school cases, see infra notes 73-169 and accom-
panying text; for an analysis of those decisions, see infra notes 444-48 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 508-28 and accompanying text.
19. ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 17 (1990).
20. Id.; CORD, supra note 8, at 7; LEVY, supra note 9, at 95.
21. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 17.
22. Id.; LEVY, supra note 9, at 96.
23. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 18; LEVY, supra note 9, at 101.
19961
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
make no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to
infringe the rights of conscience."24
Much debate has .centered around the significance of the House's use of
language in these various proposals. In short, the evidence is insufficient to
assert confidently either that the changes were made in response to simple
stylistic differences or were meant to embody substantive variations in the
meaning of the proposals themselves.2' Recall that the amendment first before
the floor that day read: "No religion shall be established by law, nor shall the
equal rights of conscience be infringed." This proposal spawned a variety of
reactions, ranging from fear that it would "abolish religion altogether,"26 to
doubt that it was necessary at all." Without expressing an opinion as to the
amendment's utility, Madison believed it necessary to calm those who in the
State Conventions feared that Congress would act under the Necessary and
Proper Clause to establish a national religion or infringe the rights of con-
science.28 He therefore furthered a version which on its face prevented Con-
gress from establishing a national religion.29 The use of "national," however,
met resistance because it implied that "this [a national] form of Government
consolidated the Union" and thereby invaded those rights reserved to the
states.30 Although Madison disagreed, he did not press the motion further.3
Representative Livermore noted his discontent with the amendment as written
and proposed the version temporarily adopted.32
No comparable records of the Senate's debate, which began on September
3, exist. Because of the debate's secret nature the record notes only that the
Senate considered and dismissed three motions.33 These read as follows:
First, "Congress shall make no law establishing one religious sect or society in
preference to others"; second, "Congress shall not make any law infringing the
rights of conscience, or establishing any religious sect or society"; and third,
"Congress shall make no law establishing any particular denomination of
24. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 18; LEVY, supra note 9, at 101.
25. Nonetheless, the scant legislative history suggests most members participating in the
House debate concerned themselves primarily, if not exclusively, with two objectives: protecting
the rights of conscience, or religious freedom in the form of religious choice, and alleviating fears
that Congress could create, or establish, a national religion. Commentators are in virtual consensus
that these were fundamental, legitimate fears which the Framers meant to address in the Religion
Clauses. The point of contention, however, is whether the Framers intended the Clauses to encom-
pass only these apprehensions. Certainly, some weight must be accorded the fact that Madison di-
rected all his comments to free exercise and formal establishments. Even Representative Gerry,
who opposed use of the term national, did so not out of any opposition to the term's inherent
concept or because he considered the amendment's reach to extend beyond prohibition of a na-
tional church, but rather because he feared an Antifederalist backlash. LEVY, supra note 9, at 98-
99.
26. Id. at 97.
27. Id.
28. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 17; CORD, supra note 8, at 9; LEVY, supra note
9, at 97.
29. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 17; LEVY, supra note 9, at 98.
30. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 18.
31. Id.; LEVY, supra note 9, at 99.
32. LEVY, supra note 9, at 98.
33. Id. at 102.
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religion in preference to another." 4 Unable to agree on any of these three
proposals, the Senate that day adopted a proposal which included the simple
statement, "Congress shall make no law establishing religion."3 Following
the House's example of indecisiveness, however, the Senate returned six days
later to pass its final version: "Congress shall make no law establishing arti-
cles of faith or a mode of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of reli-
gion."36
The House rejected the Senate's proposed amendments, and in an attempt
at reconciliation suggested a joint committee. 7 This committee formulated
the following proposal: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."38 On September
25, the Senate approved this wording, and with it the Religion Clauses. 9
III. MADISON AND JEFFERSON
Unfortunately, the men who framed the First Amendment did not explain,
at least in detail, what actions they collectively believed the Establishment
Clause encompassed. Although undoubtedly all the Framers believed the
Clause prohibited the formal establishment of a national religion, it is not clear
what, if any, other actions beyond formal establishment the Clause restrict-
ed.' Nonetheless, courts and commentators have proffered various construc-
tions.4"' None of these constructions, however, has been so hotly debated or
yielded such dramatic results as the one proffered by the Supreme Court in
1947 in Everson v. Board of Education.2 There, the Court not only unani-
mously endorsed separationism, but based its decision exclusively on the
views, acts, and writings of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson. 4' The
Court did so despite the fact that Jefferson did not even participate in the
framing, adoption, and ratification of the Establishment Clause and that Madi-
son was only one of many Framers." Given the Court's continuing propensi-
ty to frame its historical dialogues in terms of Madison's and Jefferson's
church-state jurisprudence, the following discussion describes those writings
which the Court consistently relies upon.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 18; CORD, supra note 8, at 9.
37. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 18; CORD, supra note 8, at 9; LEVY, supra note
9, at 103.
38. LEVY, supra note 9, at 103-04.
39. Id. at 104.
40. STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRIN-
CIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS 18-19 (1995).
41. Compare the separationist view of Leonard Levy, supra note 9, with the
nonpreferentialist view of Robert Cord, supra note 8.
42. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
43. Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-14. For a discussion of Everson, see infra notes 73-89 and ac-
companying text.
44. For a critique of the Court's overemphasis of Madison and Jefferson in its decisions, see
infra notes 462-506 and accompanying text.
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A. Madison's Remonstrance
In the annals of Religion Clause jurisprudence, history reserves only Jef-
ferson a pedestal so high as Madison, who was not only the fourth President
of the United States, but also a ratifier, and in essence the creator, of the Bill
of Rights. One of Madison's earliest encounters with religion and government
came in 1785, when in response to a proposed Virginia bill attempting to
impose a tax on Virginia property owners to support Christian teachers, he
authored a tract entitled "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious As-
sessments, 1785." 4' In this Remonstrance, Madison proffered fifteen argu-
ments against passage of the bill. Primary among these was the importance of
free exercise of religious conscience.' To this end, Madison wrote, "It is the
duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage, and such only, as he
believes to be acceptable to him."'47 Madison further stated that the legislature
was without such authority as to enact the bill.' If society lacked any author-
ity over religion, it was axiomatic that society's appointed representatives
could exercise no such influence; to do so was tyrannical.49 Finally, Madison
was concerned with the proven historical pattern that ecclesiastical establish-
ments tainted and corrupted religion.5"
Undoubtedly, the Remonstrance sheds light on Madison's position regard-
ing church and state. Without question, he opposed any taxes or other coercive
payments the proceeds of which specifically and exclusively supported any
one religion or religious endeavor.5 Indeed, the Remonstrance focused upon
the dangers of exalting one sect or one religion over all others. The Remon-
strance did more, however, than simply address establishments. It grounded
the right to free exercise of religion in natural law, indicating the paramount
reverence Madison accorded religious freedom.52 For Madison, protection of
these liberties entailed casting the church and the national government into
mutually exclusive spheres and forbidding each from encroaching on the
other's appointed domain.
B. Jefferson's Danbury Letter and Virginia Bill for Religious Freedom
Undoubtedly, Thomas Jefferson's metaphor that the Establishment Clause
erects a wall of separation between church and state is the most quoted state-
ment in the annals of Establishment Clause jurisprudence." Notwithstanding
45. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, 1785, re-
printed in CORD, supra note 8, at 244-49; see also ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 12;
ANSON P. STOKES & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 55 (1964).
46. CORD, supra note 8, at 244.
47. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 12; CORD, supra note 8, at 244; STOKES &
PFEFFER, supra note 45, at 56.
48. CORD, supra note 8, at 245.
49. Id. ("Because if religion be exempt from the authority of the Society at large, still less
can it be subject to that of the Legislative Body .... The Rulers who are guilty of such an en-
croachment, exceed the commission from which they derive their authority, and are Tyrants.").
50. Id. at 246.
51. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 12; CORD, supra note 8, at 246.
52. CORD, supra note 8, at 246.
53. Interestingly, Jefferson was not the original author of the metaphor. That credit belongs
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this fame, the metaphor's actual utility as an indicator of Jefferson's intent is
limited.54 The letter in which the phrase appears, an 1802 response to the
Danbury Baptist Association, neither offers any explanation of what exactly
this wall is nor any discussion of whether it is absolute.5 That Jefferson, in
using this metaphor, intended the wall to sever completely government and
religion is at best untenable, at least, insupportable. This does not suggest,
however, that Jefferson did not advocate a rigid separation, but that such ten-
dencies are best developed by other evidence.
It is not Jefferson's Danbury letter, but rather his renowned proposal enti-
tled "A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom" that demonstrates Jefferson's
insights regarding religious liberty. One historian has gone so far as to pro-
claim the bill "the most important document in American history, bar
none."56 Despite its modem repute, the bill's path to enactment was a long
and storied one.
Introduced in the Virginia legislature in 1779, it proved too radical and
thus was not enacted until 1786."7 In the interim, the general assessment con-
troversy diverted all of Jefferson's and Madison's attention from the Bill, as
they found themselves locked in a fierce struggle58 with those seeking to in-
stitute a tax which undoubtedly curtailed religious liberty. Indeed, it was this
assessment controversy which led to Madison's Remonstrance. Once Jefferson
and Madison orchestrated the assessment's defeat in 1785, both returned their
attention to Jefferson's Bill, which finally passed on January 19, 1786.'9
The Bill began with a sparkling preamble emphasizing the gravity of
religious freedoms. There, Jefferson stated, "Almighty God hath created the
mind free, and manifested his supreme will that free it shall remain, by mak-
ing it altogether insusceptible of restraint." In addition, Jefferson con-
to Roger Williams, who wrote in 1644 that when a religion "ha[si opened a gap in the hedge or
wall of separation between the garden of the Church and the wilderness of the world, God hath
ever broke down the wall itself, removed the candlestick, etc., and made his garden a wilderness,
as at this day." ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 5-6; see also STOKES & PFEFFER, supra
note 45, at 52 (discussing Roger Williams's contributions to the religious freedom debates and
influence upon Thomas Jefferson).
54. Consider the following remarks Chief Justice Rehnquist leveled at "the wall" in 1985: "It
is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of constitu-
tional history, but unfortunately the Establishment Clause has been expressly freighted with
Jefferson's misleading metaphor for nearly 40 years." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
55. For a reproduction of Jefferson's letter, see CORD, supra note 8, at 112-13.
56. Daniel L. Dreisbach, Thomas Jefferson and Bills Number 82-86 of the Revision of the
Laws of Virginia, 1776-1786: New Light on the Jeffersonian Model of Church-State Relations, 69
N.C. L. REv. 159, 160 (1990) (quoting Harvard historian Bernard Bailyn).
57. STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 45, at 52; Dreisbach, supra note 56, at 163-64.
58. Fearful of the unexpectedly strong support for the assessment, which was sponsored by
Patrick Henry, Jefferson disclosed to Madison a possible course of action: "What we have to do I
think is devoutly to pray for his [Henry's] death." Dreisbach, supra note 56, at 166. As Dreisbach
notes, however, Madison had a much more sensible solution: have Henry elected Governor so as
to remove him and his influence from the state's legislative body. Id. In the end, Madison won
out and Henry was elected Governor. Id.
59. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 12; Dreisbach, supra note 56, at 169 n.60.
60. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, 1785, in ADAMS &
EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 110 (emphasis omitted).
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demned forced contributions for the propagation of religion, and staunchly
characterized the opinions of humanity as beyond the jurisdiction of the civil
government.6' Also prohibited under the Bill were government compulsions
upon the citizenry to frequent or support religious institutions.6 2 Not surpris-
ingly, the idea expressed in the Bill's conclusion parallels that in Madison's
Remonstrance-that free exercise rights emanate from natural law and cannot
be compromised by governmental coercion or persecution.63 Noticeably, the
Bill failed to mention any restriction on religious establishments.
IV. THE CLAUSE AND THE COURT: A HISTORY
A. Introduction
Between the ratification of the Establishment Clause and 1947, the Su-
preme Court rendered few Establishment Clause decisions, and thus had no
cause to develop a comprehensive framework for resolving Establishment
Clause disputes. Of the few Establishment Clause decisions actually made,
none were meaningful or contrary to the understood meaning of the Clause:
the national government could not establish religions, but state governments
were free to legislate on the subject.'M Given this understanding, it is natural
that few conflicts over the Clause's scope occurred. In the late 1800s and
early 1900s, however, the movement to apply the provisions of the Bill of
Rights to the states gained momentum.65 As such, it was inevitable that the
debate would arise over whether the Establishment Clause should, or would,
apply to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Beginning with Everson,
which is discussed immediately below, the Supreme Court's answer to that
question was a resounding yes. With the application of the Establishment
Clause to the states, however, a new host of problems developed. These prob-
lems included the extent to which the Clause would apply to the states and the
degree to which existing state institutions, legislation, and practices would be
altered by that application.
Incorporation created an additional, and significant, difficulty-how to
construe the Clause so as to ensure its consistent application. From 1947 to
1971, the Court searched for a malleable yet effective framework. During this
period, it decided cases based mostly upon its own intuitions of those actions
it collectively believed the Clause was intended to prohibit. Not surprisingly,
the result was a jurisprudence without much consistency. In 1971, however,
the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman66 established a three part test for
use in resolving Establishment Clause issues.67 Although the Court had de-
61. Id. at 110-12.
62. Id. at 111.
63. Id. at 112.
64. SMITH, supra note 40, at 18.
65. CORD, supra note 8, at 93-101; SMITH, supra note 40, at 51.
66. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
67. For a discussion of Lemon, see infra notes 112-26 and accompanying text. The Court in
Lemon prohibited cash subsidies to parochial school teachers because the authorizing statutes
excessively entangled the state governments of New York and Rhode Island with religion. Lemon,
[Vol. 73:2
PAGE OF HISTORY OR VOLUME OF LOGIC
lineated each of the factors in previous decisions, Lemon marked the first time
the Court combined the factors to form a comprehensive framework. To be
valid under that new framework, a statute must have a secular legislative pur-
pose, must have a principal or primary effect which neither advances nor
inhibits religion, and must not foster an excessive government entanglement
with religion.' A determination of excessive entanglement consists of
"examin[ing] the character and the purposes of the institutions that are bene-
fitted, the nature of the Aid that the State provides, and the resulting relation-
ship between the government and the religious authority." '69
Oddly enough, the line of cases subsequent to the creation of the Lemon
framework has proved no more consistent than the cases decided before the
test's existence." Indeed, nearly twenty-five years after Lemon, the Court
continues to struggle with the seemingly insurmountable issue of how to de-
fine the scope of the Establishment Clause and articulate its prohibitions into a
workable framework. It appears that the Court has conceded that the Lemon
articulation is not that framework.7' Although not authoritatively disposed of,
the Court has not applied the test in any Establishment Clause decision since
1993.72
The discussion that follows demonstrates the struggle faced by the Su-
preme Court in its search for a standard. As will be shown, the Court's opin-
ions reflect a collective failure on the part of the Justices from 1947 to the
present to agree on the mandates inherent in the Establishment Clause. This
dilemma is reflected in the Court's decisions, whether in the private or public
educational sphere, or the areas of higher education and religious symbols.
B. Education and the Establishment Clause
A vast majority of the Establishment Clause cases before the Court con-
cern education. In particular, disputes implicating public education arise with
alarming frequency. For example, issues before the Court on a regular basis
have included-and continue to include-the constitutionality of school prayer,
Bible reading in classrooms, creationism, and the so-called "released time"
programs. Aid to private religious schools, and parochial schools in particular,
has also stirred much debate. In fact, it was a dispute over parochial school
aid from public generated funds which embarked the Court on the road to the
confusion now abundant in its Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
403 U.S. at 612-13.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 615.
70. Compare the pre-Lemon instructional materials turmoil, infra notes 90-111 and accompa-
nying text, with Lemon itself and the post-Lemon chaos regarding the cash subsidies cases, irfra
notes 112-49 and accompanying text.
71. For a discussion of the Lemon test's demise, see infra notes 416-43 and accompanying
text.
72. See infra notes 432-35 and accompanying text.
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1. Aid to Parochial Schools
a. Everson and the Beginning
The Court's first Establishment Clause decision of the modem era was its
1947 decision in Everson v. Board of Education." The substantive issue in
Everson involved a New Jersey statute which granted local school districts the
authority to make rules and enter into contracts for the transportation of
schoolchildren to and from school.7 4 The statute made no distinction between
private and public schools, but rather made accessibility to the aid contingent
upon the school not operating for profit.75 A taxpayer challenged the statute
because part of the reimbursement went to Catholic parochial school stu-
dents;76 hence, the law purportedly constituted a prohibited establishment of
religion.
The Court first held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
encompassed the restrictions found in the Establishment Clause." The Estab-
lishment Clause thus incorporated, the Court was free to apply it to state and
local governmental action, including the New Jersey statute in Everson." It
then delved into what it perceived to be the Clause's relevant history. In so
doing, it turned to Jefferson's Bill for Religious Liberty and Madison's Re-
monstrance.7 9 With respect to the Bill for Religious Liberty, the Court boldly
stated that the concerns expressed in the Virginia Bill mirrored exactly those
enshrined in the Establishment Clause.8" The Court then invoked Jefferson's
wall of separation metaphor as grounds for the no-aid, strict separationist
interpretation it adopted."' Although it rejected the nonpreferentialist position,
73. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
74. Everson, 330 U.S. at 3 n.l.
75. Id. This, of course, operated to allow public schools and non-profit private schools ac-
cess to the aid.
76. Id. at 3. One commentator attributes the dispute in Everson, at least in part, to the inter-
group tensions between Protestants and Catholics which developed in the post-World War 11 peri-
od. RICHARD MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION 81 (1972). Morgan posits that dur-
ing World War 1I Roman Catholics lost their consciousness of themselves as a minority group,
and that once the war was over, Catholics' attempts to exert their own identity and influence their
own culture were perceived by Protestants as disturbing and aggressive. Id. at 81-82.
77. Although the Court had previously held that the First Amendment applied to the states,
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), it had not until Everson explicitly incorporated the
Establishment Clause. For a critique of the Court's decision to incorporate the Establishment
Clause, see infra notes 508-28 and accompanying text.
78. Note that a majority of Supreme Court Justices have never favored "total incorporation,"
or the incorporation of every right found in the first eight amendments. See Note, Rethinking the
Incorporation of the Establishment Clause: A Federalist View, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1700 (1992)
[hereinafter Note]. Rather, the Court has adopted a theory of "selective incorporation," which Jus-
tice Cardozo has described as those specific pledges of particular amendments found to be "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, become
operative on the states." Id. (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)).
79. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-14.
80. Id. at 13.
81. Id. In the Court's words:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Nei-
ther a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can
force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
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the majority found the New Jersey statute constitutional, 2 apparently in part
out of fear that to otherwise hold would preclude all religions and religious
denominations from receiving, because of their faith, the benefits of public
welfare legislation."3 For the Court, its decision coincided perfectly with the
Constitution's mandate that government be neutral with respect to religion.
Because the majority characterized the benefit as flowing to the student rather
than the school, 4 it had little difficulty finding the requisite governmental
indifference. The law, therefore, was not one respecting an establishment of
religion. 5
Justices Jackson and Rutledge each wrote vigorous dissents which agreed
with the majority's analytical framework but disagreed with its conclusion.
Jackson leapt into an in-depth discussion of Catholic dogma, apparently read-
ing the statute, which was facially neutral, as if it discriminated against all
religious schools not Catholic. 6 Moreover, there was no indication that there
existed within the school district any not-for-profit private schools of other
faiths (or of no faith) that had been denied aid. Hence, Jackson's conclusion
that the statute as applied violated the Establishment Clause was unsupported
and premature. 7 In contrast, Justice Rutledge characterized Jefferson's Vir-
ginia Bill, as well as Jefferson's views on church and state, as inapposite to
the majority's conclusion.8 He also took issue with the majority's assertion
that the use of funds was for a public purpose-namely that of education of
children.
entertaining religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No
tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or in-
stitutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the
words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to
erect a "wall of separation between church and state."
Id. at 15-16 (citations omitted).
82. Id. at 18.
83. Id. at 16.
84. Id. at 18.
85. See id.
86. Id. at 21 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
87. Jackson stated that, "As applied to this taxpayer by the action he complains of, certainly
the Act does not authorize reimbursement to those who choose any alternative to the public school
except Catholic Church schools." Id. The statute did, however, authorize expenditures to any pri-
vate school whether religious or non-religious, which complied with its terms, i.e., was not operat-
ed for profit. If no alternative private schools existed within this specific school district, then
Jackson's presumption imposed a burden on the parochial schools which was not only misdirected
but also impossible to meet. If no other eligible schools existed, then the Catholic schools should
not have been denied aid unless evidence suggested that the statute was created to specifically aid
Catholic schools. Jackson mentioned no such evidence.
88. Id. at 29 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 49, 51, 52-53. Under Rutledge's views, however, religious institutions and reli-
gious people acting for religious purposes are ineligible to receive the benefits of public aid and
social welfare legislation. This constitutes discrimination against religion and could potentially
chill free exercise rights. Finally, consider that Rutledge's position rings of an unconstitutional
condition-to secure a legislatively or constitutionally permitted benefit a person would be re-
quired to forego exercising constitutional rights guaranteed under the First Amendment's Free
Exercise Clause.
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b. The Post-Everson Turmoil: Instructional Materials
Sixteen long years after its ratification of separationism, the Supreme
Court set out to more clearly delineate the bounds within which such schools
may receive aid from the public coffers. Anything but clarity, however, result-
ed from this line of cases. In Board of Education v. Allen," a 1968 case, the
Court held constitutional a New York statute that required school districts to
loan textbooks to students in grades seven through twelve who were enrolled
in any school within the district.9' The statute did not differentiate between
public and private schools, or religious and non-religious schools. Rather, it
was a blanket authorization. Relying on the Everson rationale, the Court char-
acterized the law as simply making "available to all children the benefits of a
general program to lend books free of charge." '2 Moreover, the statute autho-
rized only the loan of secular books, and each book loaned was approved by
public school officials.9" Given the secular nature of the books, the Court
refused to abandon its Everson rationale, or "child-benefit theory,"94 and ac-
cordingly found the statute not contradictory to the mandate of separation
imbedded in the Establishment Clause. 95
If Everson and Allen reflected the Court's accommodationist tendencies,
Meek v. Pittinger" embodied its separationist propensities first expressed in
Everson. In Meek, the Court held unconstitutional a statute authorizing public
school officials to lend instructional materials directly to nonpublic schools.97
These materials included books, periodicals, documents, pamphlets, photo-
graphs, maps, charts, and globes.9" Although these materials, like the text-
books in Allen, were self-policing and neutral, the Court declared them uncon-
stitutional, stating that the nonpublic schools, rather than the students, were the
primary beneficiaries." Despite this ruling, the Court upheld a separate sec-
tion of the Act which authorized public school officials to lend secular text-
books to religious schools." Yet the Act defined textbooks as books,
0'
which the Act further defined as instructional materials, 2 which the Court
declared unconstitutional." 3
The Court only two years following Meek passed judgment on yet another
instructional materials dispute in Wolman v. Walter." Wolman involved an
Ohio statute which authorized public officials to provide nonpublic school
90. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
91. Allen, 392 U.S. at 238.
92. Id. at 243.
93. Id. at 244-45.
94. See LEVY, supra note 9, at 154.
95. Allen, 392 U.S. at 248.
96. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
97. Meek, 421 U.S. at 366.
98. Id. at 355 n.4.
99. Id. at 364-66.
100. Id. at 362.
101. Id. at 354 n.3.
102. Id. at 355 n.4.
103. Id. at 366.
104. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
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students not only with instructional materials and equipment and books, but
also with standardized testing and scoring services, diagnostic services, thera-
peutic services, and field trip transportation.' 3° After again confirming the
constitutionality of secular textbook loan programs," the Court, in a surpris-
ing extension of its parochial school decisions, held that Ohio could constitu-
tionally furnish testing and scoring, °7 diagnostic,"'8 and therapeutic servic-
es."9 These services, according to the Court, posed insubstantial threats,
lacked educational content, or were offered at religious neutral locations.""
Notwithstanding these rulings, the Court was unwilling to disturb its conclu-
sion in Meek that the Establishment Clause prohibited states from loaning in-
structional materials and equipment to nonpublic schools."'
c. Cash Subsidies and Tax Exemptions
The parade of parochial school aid cases marched on in Lemon v.
Kurtzman,"2 where the Court addressed aid to religious schools of an en-
tirely different nature-cash subsidies to parochial schools and their teachers.
The companion cases at issue involved statutes passed by the Pennsylvania
and Rhode Island legislatures out of concern over the quality of the education
at each states' nonpublic schools." 3
The Rhode Island Act authorized public officials to reimburse nonpublic
school teachers of secular subjects up to 15% of their current annual sala-
ry." 4 The statute further required eligible schools to submit financial data to
the state for determination of the appropriate subsidy amount.' Moreover,
the Act required eligible teachers to use only secular teaching materials and
105. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 233.
106. Id. at 238.
107. Id. at 240-41.
108. Id. at 241.
109. Id. at 247-48.
110. Id. at 242, 244, 248.
111. Id. at 249-50. The only distinction between the Meek and Wolman programs was that the
materials and equipment in Meek were loaned directly to the school, whereas in Wolman it was
the pupil or the pupil's parent who was, theoretically, loaned the equipment. Id. at 250. Justice
Blackmun, presumably with a straight face, noted that "it would exalt form over substance if this
distinction were found to justify a result different from that in Meek." Id. Yet it was this very
distinguishing characteristic which the Court deemed so essential in both Allen and Meek with re-
spect to the textbook programs.
Even further clouding matters in Wolman was the Court's fickle decision that it violated
the Establishment Clause for nonpublic schools to use public school buses for field trips to "gov-
ernmental, industrial, cultural, and scientific centers." Id. at 252, 255. The Court characterized the
bus services in Everson as different in nature than the bus services at issue in Wolman. The trans-
portation services in Everson were routine in that the children were bused only to and from
school. Id. at 253-54. In contrast, the services in Wolman were unique, in that the students were
bused to the field trip sites. Id. Moreover, field trips are, at least for the Court, rendered meaning-
ful only through the efforts of the individual sectarian teacher. Id. at 254. Hence, for the Court,
the risk was simply too great that such a teacher would seize the moment and unconstitutionally
foster religion. Id.
112. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
113. Rapidly rising costs and low teacher salaries were particular fears the statutes were de-
signed to reverse. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607, 609.
114. Id. at 607.
115. Id. at 607-08.
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teach only secular subjects."6 The Pennsylvania law, in contrast, authorized
the subsidy directly to the parochial schools for those expenses accrued for
teacher's salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials." 7 Only courses in
math, modem foreign languages, physical science, and physical education were
eligible for these reimbursements."' Like Rhode Island, however, Pennsylva-
nia required the schools to use specific accounting procedures, submit specific
financial data, and if necessary undergo a state audit."9
After the Court delineated the three part Lemon test, 2' it proceeded to
apply its new framework. It began by accepting as valid the requisite secular
purpose as described by the respective statutes. It never determined, however,
whether the statutes' principal effect advanced religion."' Instead, it skipped
to the third element and concluded that both statutes excessively entangled
government and religion.'22 Because of both the extensive governmental con-
trols necessary to determine compliance and the fact that parochial schools
involve "substantial religious activity and purpose," the Court refused to up-
hold the laws.'23 It distinguished Allen by noting that books can be indepen-
dently inspected once to determine their contents; to assure teacher compli-
ance, however, requires a "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state
surveillance."'2 4 The Pennsylvania statute suffered from a further defect in
that the aid flowed directly to the school.'25 Coupled with the political divi-
siveness inherent in the subsidies, the number and nature of entanglements
proved too many and too pervasive to justify a finding of constitutionality.
26
A statute similar in effect but different in design to the one in Lemon was
that passed by New York granting a package of benefits to nonpublic schools
and their students. Specifically, the statute, which was challenged in Commit-
tee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,'27 provided direct
116. Id. at 608.
117. Id. at609.
118. Id. at 610.
119. Id. at 609-10.
120. Recall that the Lemon test proscribes statutes, policies, and actions that have sectarian
purposes, primarily affect or advance religion, and foster an excessive entanglement between gov-
ernment and religion. Id. at 612-13; see supra text accompanying notes 66-69.
121. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613-14.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 616-17.
124. Id. at 619.
125. Id. at 621.
126. Disputes over aid to teachers would continue to haunt the Court. Fourteen years after
Lemon, the Court invalidated two Michigan school district programs using public school funds for
various nonpublic school programs and classes. School District of the City of Grand Rapids v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 375 (1985). The Shared Time program, which was offered during the school
day involved a variety of remedial subjects. Id. The Community Education program, in contrast,
was offered at the conclusion of the school day. Id. at 376. The activities in both programs oc-
curred inside the nonpublic school buildings. Id. at 375-76. Although Shared Time program cours-
es were taught by public school teachers, instructors in the Community Education program were
conducted by nonpublic teachers, who usually taught at the same nonpublic school where they
rendered their Community Education program. Id. at 377. The Court struck both programs down,
holding that each failed the purpose prong of the Lemon test. Id. at 385. Of primary importance to
the Court were both the effective subsidy provided by the programs, id., and the "substantial risk
of state-sponsored indoctrination." Id. at 387.
127. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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grants to nonpublic schools for facilities maintenance and repair as well as tax
exemptions and tuition grants to students. Not surprisingly, the Court found all
challenged authorizations of the statute unconstitutional. 2
The provisions authorizing facilities maintenance and repair, which pos-
sessed the requisite secular purpose, had the primary effect of advancing reli-
gion by allowing sectarian schools to finance all necessary facilities upkeep
from taxpayer revenues.'29 Similarly, the tuition reimbursement program also
failed to meet the purpose requirement. 30 To this end, the Court noted that
"by reimbursing parents for a portion of their tuition bill, the State seeks to
relieve their financial burdens sufficiently to assure that they continue to have
the option to send their children to religion-oriented schools."'
' 3
The final component of the New York benefits package bestowed tax
exemptions upon parents of nonpublic school students, provided the parents'
income was greater than $5000 but less than $25000.132 As with the tuition
grants, however, the Court rejected the argument that the provision was consti-
tutional because the parent rather than the school was the beneficiary. 3  The
more difficult task for the Court lay in distinguishing the tax exemption at
issue in Nyquist from the one in Walz v. Tax Commission, 34 a case in which
the Court held that the Establishment Clause was not violated by granting
churches wholesale tax exemptions. 3 It effectively contrasted Walz by not-
ing first that the tax exemption there served the noble purpose of minimizing
church and state involvement, 36 and, second, that the exemption essentially
applied to a class of organizations composed of many non-religious institu-
tions. "'
128. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 769.
129. Id. at 774.
130. Id. at 783.
131. Id. The excessive financial relief referred to by the Court, however, simply did not exist.
The statute capped grants at $100 per child; moreover, a qualifying parent's income could be no
greater than $5000. Id. at 780. Given these statistics it is doubtful the grants influenced a great
number of, if any, parents to send their children to nonpublic schools. Indeed, the opinion over-
looked that supplying textbooks and transportation to students similarly lessened the financial
burden on parochial school students.
132. Id. at 790. The effect was to ensure that all parents of nonpublic school students earning
under $25,000 received either a tuition reimbursement grant or a tax credit.
133. Id. at 791.
134. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
135. Walz, 397 U.S. at 680.
136. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 793. The Court delineated this as follows:
To be sure, the exemption of church property from taxation conferred a benefit, albeit a
an indirect and incidental one. Yet the "aid" was a product not of any purpose to sup-
port or to subsidize, but of a fiscal relationship designed to minimize involvement and
entanglement between Church and State. The exemption... tends to complement and
reinforce the desired separation insulating each from the other. Furthermore, elimination
of the exemption would tend to expand the involvement of government by giving rise to
tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and the direct confrontations
and conflicts that follow in the train of those legal processes. The granting of the tax
benefits under the New York statute, unlike the extension of an exemption, would tend
to increase rather than limit the involvement between Church and State.
ld.
137. Id. at 793-94. The class of organizations consisted of corporations and associations orga-
nized exclusively for "the moral or mental improvement of men and women, or for religious,
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Tax exemptions were again the issue in Mueller v. Allen. 3 There, Min-
nesota allowed taxpayers a deduction for various educational expenses, includ-
ing tuition, textbooks, and transportation. 39 Although the statute was facially
neutral and applied to parents of students attending both public and nonpublic
schools,'" its purpose and effect were suspect because Minnesota law gener-
ally prohibited public schools from charging tuition.'4' Nonetheless, the
Court considered this facial neutrality paramount in distinguishing the modest
deductions available there from the grants and exemptions in Nyquist.42
Moreover, the Minnesota deductions flowed only to the individual parents
rather than to the schools themselves, 43 and were part of a comprehensive
program of similar deductions provided for in the Minnesota tax laws.'"
Given these distinctions, the Court found the Minnesota statute constitution-
al. "45
Justice Marshall, in dissent, took the majority to task for its form over
substance decision, which in effect allowed deductions strikingly similar to the
exemptions and grants found unconstitutional in Nyquist." Describing the
majority's attempt to distinguish tax deductions from tax credits and exemp-
tions as "a distinction without a difference,"'47 Marshall relied on the indis-
putable fact that most of the deduction's beneficiaries were parents of parochi-
al school children." As such, the statute's primary effect unconstitutionally
advanced religion.'
4
d. The Use of Federal Funds
In 1985 the Court decided Aguilar v. Felton,"° its most criticized and
inequitable parochial school aid decision. The facts were simple: New York
City used federal funds to provide remedial instruction to children of low-
income families on parochial school grounds.'' The classrooms were free of
religious symbols and the government provided the requisite materials.'52
bible, tract, charitable, benevolent, missionary, hospital, infirmary, educational, public playground,
scientific, literary, bar association, medical society, library, patriotic, historical or cemetery purpos-
es." Walz, 397 U.S. at 667 n.l.
138. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
139. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 391 n.l.
140. Id. at 397.
141. Id. at 405 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 398. The maximum deduction available was $700. Id. at 391. The actual tax sav-
ings were, of course, much lower.
143. Id. at 399.
144. Id. at 396.
145. Id. at 403-04.
146. Id. at 405.
147. Id. at 411.
148. Id. at 405. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, countered, "We would be loath
to adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality of a facially neutral law on annual reports reciting
the extent to which various classes of private citizens claimed benefits under the law." Id. at 401.
149. Id. at 414.
150. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
151. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 405-06.
152. Id. at 407.
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Only public school personnel effectuated the remedial instruction.' Yet, be-
cause the aid was "provided in a pervasively sectarian environment,' 54 the
necessary oversight fostered an excessive entanglement between church and
state. "'55 Justice Brennan, who wrote for the majority, feared government
agents roaming parochial school halls suspiciously peering inside classrooms
and searching profusely for a hint of sectarian influence penetrating the state
funded classes.'56 Unfortunately for the 20,000 New York City schoolchil-
dren his decision affected, Brennan proffered no evidence to substantiate this
alleged need for pervasive state oversight.
The Court's most recent parochial school aid pronouncement occurred in
1993 in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District.'" The dispute in
Zobrest centered around James Zobrest, who had been deaf since birth. 158
Although a pupil in the public schools through grade eight, his parents hoped
to enroll him in a private religious school for his upcoming ninth grade
term.5 9 To this end, both James and his parents sought, under the federal
IDEA'60 program designed to benefit disabled children, to procure a sign-
language interpreter for James's use while attending the private school. 6'
Although state officials cited the Establishment Clause as a bar to complying
with James's request,62 the Court sided with Zobrest and found that furnish-
ing the interpreter for use in a private, religious school did not violate the
Establishment Clause.
63
In reaching this conclusion, the Court considered the nature of the benefits
received by Zobrest determinative." In particular, the fact that the federal
program provided aid to any disabled child without regard to public-private or
sectarian-nonsectarian distinctions proved convincing. 65 Furthermore, instead
of providing benefits directly to the parochial school, the program merely
ensured "that a government-paid interpreter will be present in a sectarian
school only as a result of the private decision of individual parents."'" Be-
cause of this choice, no financial incentive existed for James's parents to
prefer sectarian to public schools.'67 As a final determinative factor, the
Court noted that the school itself was not relieved of any expenses that it
153. Id. at 406.
154. Id. at 412.
155. Id. at 413.
156. Id. at 414.
157. 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
158. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464.
159. Id.
160. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1992). IDEA is an acronym for the Individuals with Disabilities Edu-
cation Act. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464.
161. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464.
162. Id.
163. Id. Mention of the Lemon test was noticeably absent in Zobrest. For an argument that the
Court nonetheless relied on the factors embodied in Lemon, see Lisa S. Pierce, Making Aid With-
out Lemon?, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 565 (1994).
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would have incurred had the government not provided the interpreter.'
Hence, one is hard-pressed to find fault with the Court's assertion that in
Zobrest, "Handicapped children, not sectarian schools, are the primary benefi-
ciaries of the IDEA."' 69
2. Public Education and the Establishment Clause
a. Released Time Programs
In 1948, just one year after its historic decision in Everson, the Court in
McCollum v. Board of Education"' decided its first public education case
and addressed the so called "released time" programs. Under these arrange-
ments, students in public schools were "released" during the school day from
regular classes to receive religious instruction. In McCollum, this instruction
was carried out by religious teachers inside the schoolhouse.'' Only those
students whose parents consented could attend the religion classes; other stu-
dents were excused from participation but remained confined on school
grounds.' Writing for an 8-1 majority, Justice Black found that the program
violated the Establishment Clause and was therefore unconstitutional.' Of
primary importance to the Court was the use of the state's compulsory educa-
tion machinery to provide students for religious instruction classes." This,
according to Black, was an impermissible use of the tax-supported public
schools to aid religious groups in spreading their faith.'
Proponents of released-time programs were not discouraged by the man-
date of separation inherent in McCollum, and just four years later managed to
bring the issue before the Court once again. The released time program in
Zorach v. Clauson1 6 presented an interesting twist on the McCollum pro-
gram-the students under the Clauson plan received instruction not on school
grounds but instead at various religious facilities.'77 So in both cases the in-
struction occurred during the school day, but in McCollum the religious teach-
ers went to the children, while in Clauson the children went to the religious
teachers. Drawing on this distinction, a 6-3 Court found the Clauson program
constitutional. Speaking for the majority, Justice Douglas stated that "[tihe
First Amendment ... does not say that in every and all respects there shall be
a separation of Church and State."' 78 Effecting such an assumption, rather
than making the state neutral, Douglas observed, would render it hostile to
religion.' Such hostility is neither mandated by the Constitution nor in ac-
168. Id. at 2469.
169. Id.
170. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
171. McCoUum, 333 U.S. at 209. Teachers included Catholic priests, Jewish rabbis, and Prot-
estant instructors. See id.
172. Id. at 207-09.
173. Id. at 210. The lone dissenter was Justice Reed. Id. at 238.
174. Id. at 212.
175. Id. at 210.
176. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
177. Clauson, 343 U.S. at 308.
178. Id. at 312.
179. Id.
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cordance with our history as a religious people. s° In any event, and despite
the apparent inconsistencies between the two released time decisions, Clauson
nonetheless continues to serve as the Court's definitive answer to the released
time issue. 8'
b. School Prayer, Bible Reading, and Creation Science
The zenith of the Court's separationist campaign, as well as its most con-
troversial Establishment Clause decision, was handed down a decade after
Clauson when in Engel v. Vitale,"8 2 a 6-1 Court declared that prayer in
school was unconstitutional. 3 The prayer at issue in Engel was nondenomi-
national and read as follows: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence
upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and
our Country."'84 Students not wishing to recite the prayer were allowed ei-
ther to remain silent or leave the room.'85 In contrast to the Free Exercise
Clause, however, Establishment Clause claims do not require that a coercive
element be present.' 6 Hence, the opportunity for students to not participate
played no role in determining the recital's constitutionality. Rather, the rele-
vant issue was simply whether the state had forged an unconstitutional union
between religion and government. Given that here the state had composed an
180. Id. at 314. Douglas expounded on this notion as follows:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. We guarantee
the freedom to worship as one chooses. We make room for as wide a variety of beliefs
and creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary. We sponsor an attitude on the
part of government that shows no partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish
according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma. When the state en-
courages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the
schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions.
Id. at 313-14.
181. Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson each wrote dissenting opinions, essentially argu-
ing that there were no distinctions between McCollum and Clauson. Justice Black in particular
relied upon a supposed element of coercion implicit in the state's compulsory education laws. Id.
at 318 (Black, J., dissenting). Black, however, confused the compulsion to attend public schools
with the compulsion to attend the religion classes; the second was a result of free exercise, the
first was not. Attendance at the religion classes required parental consent, and because the instruc-
tion itself was removed from the school grounds, the attendant air of authority and endorsement in
McCollurm ceased to exist in Clauson.
Note, however, that the released time programs should be constitutional only to the extent
that they do not "punish" dissenters or those who for whatever reason opt out of attending the
religion classes. For these students, the school should not during this time become, as Justice
Jackson feared it would, a "jail for the pupil who will not go to Church." Id. at 324 (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
182. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
183. Engel, 370 U.S. at 424. Justices Frankfurter and White did not participate in the Court's
decision.
184. Id. at 422.
185. Id. at 430.
186. Id. This does not mean, however, that laws which establish religion do not coerce com-
pliance. "When the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a partic-
ular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the
prevailing officially approved religion is plain." Id. at 431. This element, however, is an issue to
be resolved under the Free Exercise Clause. Compare Justice Douglas's concurring opinion which
states that "there is no element of compulsion or coercion in New York's regulation." Id. at 438.
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official prayer to be recited by a group of Americans, the Court had little
difficulty finding such a forbidden coupling.
87
Public reaction to the Court's decision, although expected to be harsh, was
extremely intense. 8 8 In Congress, representatives and senators rushed to
sponsor a nullifying constitutional amendment.89 One senator rhetorically
queried whether "we, too are ready to embrace the foul concept of athe-
ism."'" Another maintained that "the Supreme Court has made God uncon-
stitutional."'' Criticism of the decision was not, however, limited to federal
officials. The Conference of State Governors voted unanimously to call for an
overruling constitutional amendment.9 2  Members of the clergy were
"shocked and frightened" and marvelled at the Court's insensitivity to
America's religious tradition.'93 One popular evangelist noted the increasing
secularization of the United States and argued that "[tihe Framers of our Con-
stitution meant we were to have freedom of religion, not freedom from reli-
g io n .
,194
Although intense, the criticism was not unanimous. In fact, several Protes-
tant organizations and individuals, including the Joint Baptist Committee on
Public Affairs, The Christian Century, and the Reverend Martin Luther King,
opposed the movement for a constitutional amendment, as did nearly all Jew-
ish organizations and rabbis. 5 Unexpectedly, many of the nation's major
newspapers, including the New York Times and the Washington Post, support-
ed the decision.' In any event, the movement and support for a constitu-
tional amendment dwindled as none of the proposals garnered the necessary
two-thirds majority."
Notwithstanding this reaction, the Court only one year later in Abbington
Township School District v. Schempp'98 considered and held unconstitutional
the equally divisive issue of Bible reading in public schools. Abbington Town-
ship consisted of two companion cases in which the legislature of Pennsylva-
nia and the Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore mandated that the
187. Id. at 425. Interestingly, Justice Douglas, a member of the Everson majority which up-
held the New Jersey law against an Establishment Clause attack, admitted his decision was wrong.
Recall that Everson was a 5-4 decision. See supra text accompanying notes 73-89.
188. The effects on the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence were great as well. In
fact, Professor Ira Lupu describes the decision, along with the other school prayer cases, as one of
five crucial gestures of the Court in its "embrace of the separationist ethos" between 1947-1980.
Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230, 233-34 (1994).
189. STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 45, at 378.
190. Id.
191. LEVY, supra note 9, at 185.
192. STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 45, at 378.
193. Id.
194. Id. (statement of Reverend Dr. Billy Graham).
195. Id. at 379.
196. Id. Press support was certainly not unanimous. Indeed, Levy reports that "newspaper
headlines screamed that the Court had outlawed God from the public schools." LEVY, supra note
9, at 185.
197. LEVY, supra note 9, at 185. In recent years there has been renewed increase in securing
a constitutional amendment to restore prayer in schools. For one author's view that such an
amendment impedes upon religious freedoms, see Robert S. Peck, The Threat to the American
Idea of Religious Liberty, 46 MERCER L. REV. 1123 (1995).
198. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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Bible be read aloud to students at the beginning of the school day.'" Specifi-
cally, Pennsylvania required that at least ten verses be read and the Lord's
Prayer thereafter recited."° No comments accompanied the reading and those
children whose parents requested in writing were excused.2"' These
nonparticipants, however, could in effect not escape the reading, as it was
broadcast over the school's intercommunications system.2"2 Baltimore's plan
was substantially similar. It authorized one chapter to be read from the Bible
and authorized nonparticipation if the child's parents consented." 3
In a precursor to the Lemon test, the Court examined the "purpose and the
primary effect of the encroachment," and noted that enactments which either
advance or inhibit religion violate the Establishment Clause."' Hence, to
withstand Establishment Clause scrutiny "there must be both a secular legisla-
tive purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits reli-
gion.""0 5 Applying these principles, the Court found both the Pennsylvania
and Baltimore directives unconstitutional.2' Although both laws had secular
purposes, the primary effect of each was religious in nature."3 Moreover, the
Court reiterated its earlier implicated position that coercion is not a predicate
for an Establishment Clause violation.2"' As such, the ability of students to
opt out of the readings was irrelevant." 9
In his concurrence, Justice Brennan launched into an exhaustive historical
discussion, but in an odd move simultaneously eschewed history. Instead of
strict reliance on history, Brennan preferred to base his decision upon "wheth-
er the practices here challenged threaten those consequences which the Fram-
ers deeply feared; whether, in short, they tend to promote that type of inter-
dependence between religion and state which the First Amendment was de-
signed to prevent."2 ' Hence, Brennan stated that fruitless searches into the
minds of Madison, Jefferson, Washington, and the other Founders to deter-
mine what each would have thought, either individually or collectively, with
respect to modem church-state issues were useless. Invoking John Marshall's
often used but essentially meaningless utterance that "we must never forget
that it is a Constitution we are expounding," Brennan proclaimed that the
Court should only use the Founders' history for its broad purposes rather than
199. Abbington Township, 374 U.S. at 205, 211.
200. Id. at 207.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 211.
204. Id. at 222.
205. Id. (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)).
206. Id. at 226-27.
207. Id. at 223-24. Proponents of both programs asserted that each was passed for secular
reasons, such as "the promotion of moral values, the contradiction to the materialistic trends of
our times, the perpetuation of our institutions and the teaching of literature." Id. at 223.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 224-25.
210. Id. at 236 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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its specific practices. 2' Brennan failed to recognize, however, that specific
practices are the broad purposes put into action.
In 1985 the specter of school prayer again reared its head, this time in the
intensely controversial guise of moments of silence. Since 1962 and the
Court's decision outlawing school prayer, critics had been searching faithfully
for a comparable surrogate which could pass constitutional muster. At least
twenty-five states had found what appeared to be a workable constitutional
substitute.2 2 These states authorized moments of silence at the beginning of
each school day, during which students were free to meditate, pray, or simply
sit quietly. The empowering legislation in these various states, however, only
authorized a moment of silence-neither the statute, nor in theory the public
school officials, encouraged students to use the moment of silence for prayer.
Alabama fell into this category until 1981, when it amended its moment of si-
lence statute to authorize a "period of silence 'for meditation or voluntary
prayer.' 213 Just one year later in 1982 it further amended the statute to allow
teachers to lead willing students in a voluntary prayer.2 These amendments
led to Wallace v. Jaffree,2 5  an extraordinary case which for many
reasons216 wound its way quickly through the federal dockets to the Supreme
Court.
Significantly, the plaintiff in Wallace did not challenge Alabama's original
and still valid moment of silence statute. Rather, plaintiff objected to the two
amended versions, which in his mind, encouraged prayer, either silently or
aloud. 7 Moreover, because the Court in a previous opinion had ruled the
second amended version, which authorized teachers to lead willing students in
prayer, unconstitutional, the sole and narrow issue considered was the adden-
dum to the statute which explicitly authorized use of the moment of silence
for voluntary prayer.2 8 Applying Lemon, the Court concluded that the
statute's sole purpose was to advance religion.2 9 Both the legislative history
and the testimony of the bill's primary sponsor made this determination an
easy one. State Senator Donald G. Holmes, when testifying before the District
211. Id. at 241. Brennan's view held that the Establishment Clause prohibits "those in-
volvements of religious with secular institutions which (a) serve the essentially religious activities
of religious institutions; (b) employ the organs of government for essentially religious purposes; or
(c) use essentially religious means to serve governmental ends, where secular means would suf-
fice." Id. at 295.
212. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
213. Id. at 40.
214. Id.
215. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
216. One of these reasons was the maverick opinion of the district court judge, who rebel-
liously concluded that the two amended statutes were an attempt by Alabama to encourage reli-
gious activity, but proceeded to find them constitutional because "the establishment clause of the
first amendment to the United States Constitution does not prohibit the state from establishing a
religion." Wallace, 472 U.S. at 41, 45. In short, the judge single-handedly attempted to expunge
the Court's previously determined Fourteenth Amendment incorporation of the Establishment
Clause. Not surprisingly, the Court took offense at the judge's attempted rebellion and reaffirmed
its commitment to incorporation. Id. at 48-49.
217. Id. at 41.
218. Id. at 41-42.
219. Id. at 55-56.
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Court, stated the bill was "an effort to return voluntary prayer to our public
schools" and that passage of this bill was "a beginning and a step in the right
direction."22 When asked if this was his sole motivation for passage of the
bill, he stated, "I did not have no other purpose in mind."22' Similar state-
ments appeared in the statute's legislative history.2 Contrasting this intent
with a law which simply protects "every student's right to engage in voluntary
prayer during an appropriate moment of silence," '23 the Court stated that the
statute's endorsement of the manner in which the moment of silence was to be
used violated the principle of government neutrality toward religion.
224
The Court's most recent statement addressing school prayer is its 1992
decision of Lee v. Weisman,22 in which the Court held prayer at graduation
ceremonies unconstitutional. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy noted
the pervasive involvement of government and religion in commencement
prayers.226 Following this, he briefly mentioned the Lemon test but then
based his opinion on the supposed element of coercion implicit in the com-
mencement exercise,228 all the while overlooking that the Court had express-
ly repudiated the existence of such a factor, either implicit or explicit, in Es-
tablishment Clause claims.
229
220. Id. at 43.
221. Id. at 57.
222. Id. at 57 n.43.
223. Id. at 59.
224. Id. at 60. All indications are that had the statute proffered some secular purpose, it would
have survived scrutiny. For example, Justice Powell in concurrence stated outright that he "would
vote to uphold the Alabama statute if it also had a clear secular purpose." Id. at 66 (Powell, J.,
concurring). Similarly, Justice O'Connor differentiated the Alabama statute from other moment of
silence authorizations because its unavoidable conclusion pointed to the state's intent to endorse
prayer in public schools. Id. at 77 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justices Rehnquist, White, and Bur-
ger supported a finding of constitutionality in spite of the statute's alleged voluntary prayer en-
dorsement. Id. at 85-91 (Burger, J., dissenting). Justice White considered the statute as merely
providing a preemptive legislative answer to a student's inquiry as to whether the moment of
silence could be used for prayer. Id. at 91 (White, J., dissenting). Burger remarked that simply
amending the statute to permit voluntary prayer did not constitute an endorsement, and, further-
more, no evidence existed which suggested that the entire Alabama legislature accepted the
sponsor's motive. Id. at 85-87 (Burger, J., dissenting). Rehnquist attacked the Court's strict-
separationist history, and again put forth his historical argument for nonpreferentialism, claiming
that even generalized endorsements of voluntary prayer did not violate the Establishment Clause.
Id. at 113-14 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
225. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
226. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2655.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 2661 ("The sole question presented is whether a religious exercise may be con-
ducted at a graduation ceremony in circumstances where, as we have found, young graduates who
object are induced to conform."). Kennedy reiterated this coercion element throughout the opinion.
For example, at another point, he states:
The undeniable fact is that the school district's supervision and control of a high school
graduation ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending stu-
dents to stand as a group or, at least maintain a respectful silence during the Invocation
and Benediction. This pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt
compulsion.
Id. at 2658; see supra text accompanying note 186.
229. For an argument in favor of Justice Kennedy's coercion test, see Timothy C. Caress, Is
Justice Kennedy the Supreme Court's Lone Advocate for the Coercion Element in Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence? An Analysis of Lee v. Weisman, 27 IND. L. REV. 475 (1993); see also
Symposium, Religion and the Public Schools After Lee v. Weisman, 43 CASE W. L. REV. 795
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For this reason, Blackmun and Souter wrote concurring opinions, both
joined by Stevens and O'Connor. Blackmun applied the Lemon test and con-
cluded that the prayer served an unconstitutional religious purpose.230 More-
over, Blackmun believed that the government, by placing its imprimatur upon
the prayer, had undoubtedly advanced and promoted religion."' For his part,
Souter wrote to defend the Court's no-aid approach of forty-five years from
what he may have perceived as increasing pressure to embrace a more
accommodationist, nonpreferentialist philosophy.232 This wing of the Court,
now numbering four,2 33 voiced itself in Scalia's dissent, which bashed both
Kennedy's coercion test (described by Scalia as the Court's "psycho-jour-
ney")234 and the concurring Justices reliance on Lemon.2 35 As one com-
mentator notes, Lee v. Weisman was just the first shot in the commencement
prayer battle.236
Between the prayer issues involved in Wallace and Lee, the Court ad-
dressed a public education issue of a different kind-whether states could
require public school teachers to instruct students on the topic of "creation
science." The case which presented this issue, Edwards v. Aguillard,237 in-
volved a Louisiana statute requiring public schools which taught evolution to
also teach what it termed creation science, or "the scientific evidence for cre-
ation and inferences from those scientific evidences.""23 Despite the fact that
(1993) (debating whether Lee v. Weisman marked the end of the Lemon test and served as a pre-
lude to development of a coercion test).
230. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2663 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
231. Id. at 2664.
232. Id. at 2667 (Souter, J., concurring). Ironically, both Souter and Scalia drew from the
same historical practices and works, including those of Madison, to reach their diametrically op-
posed conclusions. Id. at 2674, 2680.
233. These four were Justices Scalia, White, and Thomas, as well as Chief Justice Rehnquist.
Id. at 2678.
234. Id. at 2684.
235. Id. at 2685. In contrast to limiting religious harmony, Scalia characterized the scenario as
follows:
The founders of our Republic knew the fearsome potential of sectarian religious belief to
generate civil dissension and civil strife. And they also knew that nothing, absolutely
nothing, is so inclined to foster among religious believers of various faiths a tolera-
tion-no, an affection-for one another than voluntarily joining in prayer together, to
the God whom they all worship and seek. Needless to say, no one should be compelled
to do that, but it is a shame to deprive our public culture of the opportunity, and indeed
the encouragement, for people to do it voluntarily. The Baptist or Catholic who heard
and joined in the simple and inspiring prayers of Rabbi Gutterman on this official and
patriotic occasion was inoculated from religious bigotry and prejudice in a manner that
can not be replicated. To deprive our society of that important unifying mechanism, in
order to spare the nonbeliever what seems to me the minimal inconvenience of standing
or even sitting in respectful nonparticipation, is as senseless in policy as it is unsupport-
ed in law.
Id. at 2686.
236. LEVY, supra note 9, at 204.
237. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
238. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 581. In 1968, the Court had grappled with a substantially similar
problem. In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), the Court held invalid an Arkansas statute
which prohibited public schools from teaching, or using any textbook which taught the theory of
evolution. ld. at 98-99. Although the Court recognized the power of the state to proscribe the
scope of its public school curriculum, it held that such power did not extend to those acts whose
purpose was to excise a particular topic because it was contrary to widely held religious beliefs
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the Louisiana legislature's stated purpose in passing the Act was to protect
academic freedom,239 the Court probed the substantial legislative history and
concluded that the legislature had identified no clear secular purpose.2"
Instead, the Court concluded the Act's primary purpose was to "advance the
religious viewpoint that a supernatural being created humankind."24 ' Al-
though the Court reached this conclusion by purportedly relying on the Act's
legislative history,242 Justices Scalia and Rehnquist pointed out in dissent that
the history evidenced no intent to advance religion.243 Instead, the history, as
recorded over a period of nearly a year, demonstrated that the Act's stated
purpose was indisputably secular.2" According to Scalia the majority relied
not on the stated purpose of the Act in striking it down, but rather on the reli-
gious motivations of those who initially passed the Act.245 Hence, the majori-
ty overlooked that the Establishment Clause does not forbid laws passed for
religious motivations, but rather laws that have the purpose of advancing reli-
gion.2" Moreover, the Court had historically accepted a legislature's stated
secular purpose without subjecting that purpose to any examination, let alone
the type of legal gymnastics required to imply a nonsecular purpose to the
Louisiana law here.247 Nonetheless, the majority was unable to conceive of a
nonreligious theory of creationism, and more or less equated creation science
with the theory of creation as proffered in the Bible.2" Given this mindset, it
is no doubt the Court never wavered from its conclusion that the Louisiana
law's primary and unconstitutional purpose was to advance religious beliefs.
c. Equal Access
At the same time that the moment of silence, commencement ceremony,
and creation science disputes were brewing, another issue involving the public
schools was coming to a head. That issue was equal access to public school
facilities-access not only for students but also for other community organiza-
tions. The first case to address this issue was the 1990 decision of Board of
Education of the Westside Community Schools v. Mergens.249 There, a Ne-
braska secondary school cited the Establishment Clause and an express school
board policy in denying Bridget Mergen's request to form a Christian club at
and violative of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 107-08.
239. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 581.
240. Id. at 585.
241. Id. at 591.
242. Id. at 591 n.10, 591-92.
243. Id. at 610 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 620-21.
245. Id. at 614-15.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 613.
248. See LEVY, supra note 9, at 192. Justice Brennan
regarded creation science as if it were an oxymoronic term for a religious belief; he did
not address himself to the fact that it claimed to be scientific and to rest on scientific
evidence. He saw only the relation between creationism and the Book of Genesis. In that
regard his opinion for the Court was unfair and misleading.
Id.
249. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
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the school. 2" This denial, based on the Court's separationist precedent, was
made in spite of the school's recognition of at least thirty other student
groups.25' In response to the denial, Mergens, who was a student at the
school, sued the school board under the Equal Access Act, a federal law
which prohibited public secondary schools receiving federal financial assis-
tance from denying students equal access to open forums based on the content
of the students' speech.252
Although the school board raised the shield of the Establishment Clause
as its defense, the majority effectively side-stepped the issue by limiting its
holding to the conclusion that the Act itself required the school to allow the
club.253 The critical issue thus became whether, as the school board alleged,
the Act itself violated the Establishment Clause. In holding that it did not, the
Court noted that "if a State refused to let religious groups use facilities open
to others, then it would demonstrate not neutrality but hostility toward reli-
gion. 12 4 To this end, the Court proceeded to apply the Lemon test and
deemed it met, finding both a secular legislative purpose which was not in-
tended to endorse or disapprove of religion, and no excessive govern-
ment/religion entanglement.255
An open issue after Mergens was whether public schools which had poli-
cies allowing community groups to use school facilities after the conclusion of
the school day were compelled to prohibit use of the grounds to religious
groups or groups with religious purposes. The Court addressed this issue in
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,26 and in a
relatively brief opinion concluded that no Establishment Clause violation oc-
curred by allowing a church group after-hours access to show a film, the
viewing of which was open to the public, on school grounds. 7 According to
the Court, these factors ensured the absence of any realistic danger that outsid-
ers would perceive the school as endorsing a religion or creed."8 As did the
coercion issue in Lee v. Weisman, this inquiry into endorsement evoked strong
responses from Justices Scalia and Kennedy, who both concurred in the deci-
sion.259 Notwithstanding this internal quibbling among the Justices, it at least
appears that given Mergens and Lamb's Chapel, the Court as a whole is com-
mitted to preserving equal rights of access for, and preventing unfair discrimi-
nation against, religious groups and groups with religious messages seeking to
use public school facilities.
250. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 232-33.
251. Id. at 231.
252. Id. at 233 (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1992)).
253. Id. at 247.
254. Id. at 248.
255. Id. at 248-50, 252.
256. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993). For in-depth discussions of Lamb's Chapel, see Wirt P. Marks,
The Lemon Test Rears Its Ugly Head Again: Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
School District, 27 U. RICH. L. REv. 1153 (1993); Robert P. Viar, Jr., Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free School District: A Modest Home for God in the Public Schools, 71 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 965 (1994).
257. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 2149, 2151.
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Undoubtedly, one of the Court's oddest and most unjust public school
cases is the 1994 decision of Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village
School District v. Grumet." Kiryas Joel is a village composed entirely of
members of the Satmar Hasidic sect,26 who attempt, at all costs, to avoid as-
similation into the modem world.262 To this end, all children attend private
religious schools, except for the few, numbering approximately forty, who are
mentally handicapped.26 Although these children received special education
services from public school teachers at a nearby parochial school, this practice
ceased in 1985."6 After the Court's mandate in Aguilar, these children were
forced to attend public schools outside the village.265 This arrangement lasted
only a short time, however, as most parents removed their children from the
secular schools because of the attendant emotional distress and trauma
wrought by the children's attendance. 2" To alleviate the problem, the New
York legislature passed in 1989 a statute creating a separate school district for
the village.26 This district was designed to deal particularly with the needs
of the handicapped children, and all evidence suggested that the only school
operated by the new district provided special education for these handicapped
children.2" Moreover, Kiryas Joel students were not the only members of
this school; several neighboring districts sent similarly handicapped children to
the Kiryas Joel school district. In fact, two-thirds of the students came from
outside the village.269
Notwithstanding that the authorizing statute made not one mention of
religion, and that the only courses offered at the school were secular in nature,
the Court found the Kiryas Joel district unconstitutional.27 ° Justice Souter,
writing for a 6-3 majority, concluded that the New York legislature had un-
constitutionally created a school district based on nothing but the inhabitants'
religion. 7' In short, Souter noted that "a state may not delegate its civil au-
thority to a group chosen according to a religious criterion." '272 To do so vio-
lated the Establishment Clause's mandates of government neutrality.
273
In a blistering attack on the majority's incredulous decision, Justice Scalia,
joined by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist, took the Court to task
260. 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994). For discussions of Kiryas Joel, see Basilios E. Tsingos, Forbid-
den Favoritism in the Government Accommodation of Religion: Grumet and the Case for Over-
turning Aguilar, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 867 (1995) (maintaining that Kiryas Joel conforms
with the requisite separation of church and state); Note, Sorting Through the Establishment Clause
Tests, Looking Past the Lemon, 60 MO. L. REV. 653 (1995) (discussing the Justices' failure to
develop a workable alternative to the Lemon test).
261. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2484.
262. Id. at 2485.
263. Id. at 2486.
264. Id. at 2485.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 2486.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 2484.
271. Id. at 2487.
272. Id. at 2488.
273. See id. at 2491.
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for its blindness to the facts and its obtuse application of the Establishment
Clause. In dissent, Scalia remarked that, "The Court today finds that the Pow-
ers That Be, up in Albany, have conspired to effect an establishment of the
Satmar Hadism; I do not know who would be more surprised at this discov-
ery: the Founders of our Nation or Grand Rebbe Joel Teitelbaum, founder of
the Satmar. ' '274 Scalia, whose historical analysis is sometimes questionable,
grasped the issue here. As historian Leonard Levy notes, Scalia perceived the
Satmar Hadist's peculiarities as cultural, not religious; hence, to hold, as
Souter and the majority did, that protection of this small minority sect violated
the Establishment Clause is inapposite to the very reason for the entire
Constitution's existence.275 In short, Kiryas Joel represents little more than
the culmination of forty years of unduly rigid separationism.
3. Higher Education and the Establishment Clause
Establishment Clause challenges to statutes and policies involving higher
education are not only fewer in number but also lower in profile than those
concerning primary or secondary education in both private and public schools.
This is due in part to the widely-held creed that higher education, and univer-
sity campuses in particular, hold innate a preeminent level of academic free-
dom. Moreover, the Court understands that university students are less impres-
sionable than schoolchildren, whose sensitive needs it seeks to protect from
overwhelming religious pressures.
As with aid to parochial schools, aid to religiously-affiliated colleges and
universities generates a substantial amount of the higher education Establish-
ment Clause litigation. Consider in this respect Tilton v. Richardson,276 a
1971 decision in which the Court sustained provisions of a federal act
"provid[ing] construction grants for buildings and facilities used exclusively
for secular educational purposes." '277 Although private religious institutions
undoubtedly benefitted from the grants, the Act itself was facially neutral, and
"carefully drafted" to ensure the colleges would engage in only secular func-
tions within the federally funded facilities.278 As such, the holding, like those
in Everson and Allen, simply permitted sectarian institutions to participate in
and receive the benefits of neutral governmental assistance programs.7 9
274. Id. at 2505-06 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
275. See LEVY, supra note 9, at 256. Levy further noted that this case was about the special
needs of handicapped children and "not at all about religious education." Id. As such, the child-
benefit theory, which neither the majority or the dissent considered, should have been controlling.
Id.
276. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
277. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 674-75.
278. Id. at 679. Note, however, that the Court did strike down one provision limiting the use
on secular restrictions to twenty years. Id. at 683. Because there was no guarantee and mechanism
for ensuring that the facilities would not then be used for sectarian activities, the Court effectively
extended the provision's time frame and the corresponding restriction on sectarian use to the life
of the facility. Id.
279. Id. at 679.
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A statute similar in effect to that in Tilton was at issue in Hunt v.
McNair!"° The mechanism through which the state tendered the aid, how-
ever, was substantively different. South Carolina permitted colleges and uni-
versities to submit to a state authority proposals for construction of various
educational facilities."' Upon receipt of a proposal, the authority issued rev-
enue bonds, the proceeds of which the college received and used to fund the
proposed project.282 The college, in turn, conveyed the project to the authori-
ty, which then leased the project back to the college until the institution paid
back the bond amount. 83 By adhering to this procedure the authority ensured
no taxpayer funds supported private religious institutions.284 Unable to signif-
icantly distinguish the aid in Hunt from that approved only two terms before
in Tilton the Court sustained the South Carolina statute. 5
Three years after Hunt, the Court in Roemer v. Board of Public Works of
Maryland8 . sustained a Maryland statute authorizing grants to private colleg-
es. Although the funds could be used only for secular purposes," 7 the subsi-
dies were undoubtedly substantial and of a more pervasive nature than the
construction grants or revenue bonds at issue in Tilton or Hunt. As in Tilton,
however, the Court relied on its "participation in government benefit pro-
grams" rationale to lend credence to its decision. 88 Lost in the shuffle, how-
ever, was the fact that in Tilton and Hunt the legislation authorized benefits on
a neutral basis-that is, both public and private parties purportedly benefitted
equally. Here, the law by its terms applied only to private institutions. Hence,
the only conceivable rationale for the Court's invocation of the government
benefit theory posits that to preclude private religious institutions from govern-
ment aid distributed to other private institutions constitutes discrimination
against, or governmental hostility towards, religion.
The Court in Roemer further delineated the function and scope of the
primary effect analysis in the higher education context. Relying on the ap-
proach set forth in Hunt, the Court characterized the primary-effect element as
both prohibiting state aid from flowing to institutions so pervasively sectarian
that secular activities cannot be separated from sectarian ones, and permitting
funding only of those secular activities which can be so separated.2' 9 Here,
although religion or theology courses were mandatory and some classes began
with prayer, the Court deemed both requirements met.2" Important in this
respect was that faculty hiring decisions were made on a religion-blind basis,
ensuring the appropriate level of professional standards as well as relegation of
280. 413 U.S. 734, 736 (1973).
281. Hunt, 413 U.S. at 736-37.
282. See id. at 737-38.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 738.
285. Id. at 746-49.
286. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
287. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 740-41.
288. Id. at 745-47.
289. ld. at 753-54.
290. Id. at 756-57.
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religious matters to the periphery of the overall institutional environment.29" '
As to matters of sectarian funding, the Court uncharacteristically appeared
content to trust the judgment of the state oversight council and the institutions
themselves.292
One of the Court's most reasonable (and reasoned) Establishment Clause
decisions is Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind.293
There, the Court held the Clause did not prevent a state from providing finan-
cial assistance, as part of a comprehensive statute authorizing aid to visually
handicapped persons, to a blind person attending a private religious college
and studying for a career in the ministry.294 In short, the Court reasoned the
aid flowed only to the religious institution as "a result of the genuinely inde-
pendent and private choices of aid recipients."295 Hence, the individual, rath-
er than the state, made the decision to support the religious institution.2"
Moreover, because the statute made the aid available to Witters regardless of
where he chose to pursue his education, it devised no financial incentive for
him to choose sectarian education over secular education.297
It was not aid but access at the heart of the dispute in Widmar v. Vin-
cent,29" a 1981 case in which the Court required a university to permit reli-
gious groups to meet in university facilities.' By opening its doors general-
ly to other groups, the university had created an open forum and was therefore
obligated to justify its discriminations and exclusions.'" Because the
university's only rationale for excluding the group was the religious content of
its speech,"' the First Amendment required the university to proffer a com-
pelling interest for its discrimination." 2 Although the Court agreed that com-
plying with the constitutional mandates inherent in the Establishment Clause
constituted a compelling interest, it nonetheless held that neutral policies were
not "incompatible with this Court's Establishment Clause cases."' '3 Such
open-forum policies, the Court concluded, had neither a religious purpose nor
the primary effect of advancing religion." Nor, as the university alleged,
would allowing religious groups access create a perception of state endorse-
ment of religion, any more than allowing a "Young Socialist Alliance" group
access would confer a state imprimatur of socialism.3"5 Hence, at least in this
291. Id. at 757-58.
292. Id. at 760.
293. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
294. Witters, 474 U.S. at 482.
295. Id. at 488.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
299. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 264-65.
300. Id. at 267.
301. Id. at 269.
302. Id. at 270.
303. Id. at 271.
304. Id. at 273.
305. Id. at 274.
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instance, both the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses limited the applica-
bility of the Establishment Clause.3"
C. Religious Symbols and the Establishment Clause
The debate over establishment, and the corresponding controversy over
nonpreferentialism and separationism, rarely exists outside of the educational
context. Nonetheless, the most recent addition to the long list of potentially
divisive Establishment Clause issues is the placement of governmentally spon-
sored religious symbols on public or private land during the holiday season. In
only two decisions regarding the appropriateness of such symbols, however,
the Court managed to produce a multiplicity of inconsistent opinions. In 1984
the Court in Lynch v. Donnelly"' sustained an Establishment Clause attack
against a forty-year Pawtucket, Rhode Island tradition of displaying a city
owned creche, or nativity scene, in a private park owned by a non-profit orga-
nization." 8 Secular decorations of the holiday season, such as a Christmas
tree, a Santa Clause house, reindeer pulling Santa's sleigh, and a host of cut-
out figures, surrounded the creche.3" Applying the Lemon test, the Court
characterized the city's erection of the creche as having the secular purpose of
depicting "the historical origins of this traditional event long recognized as a
National Holiday."3 Nor, the Court asserted, did including the creche in the
display advance religion.3 ' Instead of articulating this assumption, however,
the Court simply noted the benefit to religion here was no greater than that
conferred in other decisions, such as Allen, Everson, and Roemer."2
The dissenters, led by Justice Brennan, attacked the Court for characteriz-
ing the creche as a secular symbol representative of the holiday season." 3
The religious message necessarily present in the creche's very existence was
not eliminated simply by surrounding it with secular holiday symbols.3 4 In
short, the presence of Rudolph and Santa in no way diminished the message of
the creche--"that God sent His son into the world to become a Messiah."3
Given the creche's irrefutable religious content, its placement by a public
body, even on nonpublic land, benefitted religion and therefore violated the
Establishment Clause.3' 6
306. Id. at 276.
307. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). For criticisms of this decision, see Glenn S. Gordon, Lynch v.
Donnelly: Breaking Down the Barriers to Religious Displays, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 185 (1985);
Joshua D. Zarrow, Of Crosses and Creches: The Establishment Clause and Publicly Sponsored
Displays of Religious Materials, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 477 (1986).
308. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 680.
311. Id. at 681-82.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 709 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
314. Id. at 708.
315. Id. at 711.
316. Id. at 695.
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Four years later, Allegheny County v. ACLU" forced the Court to reck-
on with its decision in Lynch. Like Lynch, the dispute in Allegheny County in-
volved a creche; unlike Lynch, however, it also involved a menorah." Both
symbols were situated on public property, but in different locales." 9 Yet, in
an odd move, the Court required the county to remove the creche but allowed
the menorah to remain. Placement of the creche on the "Grand Staircase" of
the county courthouse sent the "unmistakable message that [the County] sup-
port[ed] and promot[ed] the Christian praise to God that is the creche's reli-
gious message.""32 Unlike the creche in Lynch, the one here was not sur-
rounded by secular manifestations of the holiday season. Hence, the county
had unconstitutionally endorsed religion.32
A group of dissenters characterized the Court's conclusion on the creche
issue as "an unjustified hostility toward religion, a hostility inconsistent with
our history and our precedents." '322 Following Lynch's lead, Kennedy depict-
ed the county as simply celebrating the season.323 Given that the creche rep-
resented no real threat to religious liberty and that the county had not used its
governmental power to further any Christian interests, he failed to see the
rationale for its invalidity.324
Further entangling the decision was the menorah issue. Only two of the
five Justices, Blackmun and O'Connor, who declared the creche unconstitu-
tional believed the menorah to be constitutional. Three members of the majori-
ty consistently concluded that both violated the Establishment Clause. In con-
trast, the four dissenters, White, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy all thought
both the menorah and the creche constitutional. Hence, it is Blackmun and
O'Connor who accounted for the different outcomes.
In the majority opinion addressing the menorah, from which Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens, who had voted for holding the creche unconstitutional,
dissented, the Court relied on two facts to support its holding. First, the meno-
rah had a cultural as well as a religious message.3 2 Therefore, acknowledg-
ing Chanukah as a secular holiday coincided with and was consistent with the
tradition of celebrating Christmas as a secular holiday.326 Second, the meno-
rah was merely a component of a larger display which included a 45-foot
Christmas tree.32' As such, the tree predominated the display and overshad-
owed the 18-foot tall menorah, which served simply as a reminder "that
317. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
318. Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 578.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 579, 600.
321. Id. at 599-600.
322. Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the numerous opinions in Alle-
gheny County, see Barbara S. Barrett, Religious Displays and the First Amendment:. County of
Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 13 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 399 (1990).
323. Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 663.
324. Id. at 664-65.
325. Id. at 613-14.
326. Id. at 615.
327. Id. at 617.
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Christmas is not the only traditional way of observing the winter-holiday sea-
son."
328
O'Connor tacked a different approach but reached the same conclusion as
the majority. Important to her, however, was a sign accompanying the meno-
rah and tree exhibit which stated, "During this holiday season, the city of
Pittsburgh salutes liberty. Let these festive lights remind us that we are the
keepers of the flame of liberty and our legacy of freedom. '329 The city's
erection of the menorah, therefore, constituted not an endorsement of religion
but rather a "message of pluralism and freedom. '3" Hence the distinction
between the religious message inherent in the creche and the political message
attendant to the menorah serves to reconcile O'Connor's seemingly inconsis-
tent opinions.
V. RECENT ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE DECISIONS
A. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette
3
Capitol Square, handed down on the last day of the Court's 1995 term,
was despite its dissentious features an easy case. Indeed, it was the nature of
the facts rather than the constitutionality of the action which created a hotbed
of controversy. At the heart of the debate was the appropriate use of Capitol
Square, a 10-acre public plaza encircling the Columbus, Ohio statehouse.332
The Square enjoyed a century old history as a public forum for "free discus-
sion of public questions, or for activities of a broad purpose. '3 3 To regulate
access to the forum, Ohio law vested control over the permit process to the
Capitol Square Review Board (Board), which traditionally allowed broad ac-
cess and diverse groups to conduct events in the Square.334 In late November
1993, the Board acted on two applications.33 it granted one, denied the oth
er.336 The application approved permitted a rabbi to erect a menorah. 3 7 The
application denied prevented the Klan from erecting a cross.33" To substanti-
ate its denial of the Klan's application, the Board cited both the Ohio and
United States Constitutions.339
After an unsuccessful attempt to procure administrative relief, the Klan's
leader, Vincent Pinette, sued the Board in federal district court .3' Despite
the Board's assertion that the Establishment Clause prevented it from permit-
ting the Klan to display its cross, that court issued an injunction requiring the
328. Id.
329. Id. at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
330. Id.
331. 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).
332. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2444.
333. Id.
334. Id.





340. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 844 F. Supp. 1182 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
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Board to grant the permit.34' In support of its decision the district court
weighed heavily both the First Amendment protection accorded free speech
and the lack of evidence indicating that display of the cross constituted state
endorsement of religion.342 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed.343 Hence,
the Klan's cross went on display in Capitol Square.344
Although the 1993-94 Holiday season came and went, the Capitol Square
dispute lingered until June 29, 1995, when a 7-2 Supreme Court affirmed the
lower courts' decisions. The Court, however, proved incapable of reaching a
consensus as to the rationale underlying its conclusion. Rather, the fragmented
Court could produce only a plurality opinion, as well as three rounds of con-
currences and two dissents. Justice Scalia spoke for the four member plurality,
which also included Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy and Thom-
as. 3' At the outset, he rejected the Klan's attempt to recharacterize the issue
not as one regarding establishment of religion but as one regarding content-
based speech discrimination. The Court, Scalia remarked, would hear the case
as the lower courts decided it and the parties presented it.3' Hence, the sole
issue for decision was that pertaining to the Establishment Clause.347
The Board's decision to ground the Klan's denial in the Establishment
Clause proved in hindsight to be cataclysmic. As the plurality noted, the
Klan's display constituted private expression subject to the full protection of
the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause.3" Moreover, because Capitol
Square constituted a public forum, the Board could prohibit protected conduct,
such as the Klan's, only if the restriction was narrowly drawn to serve a com-
pelling state interest.349 Although the Court agreed with the Board that com-
pliance with the Establishment Clause constituted a compelling state interest, it
refused to characterize the Klan's attempt to erect a cross in a traditional pub-
lic forum as an act prohibited by the Establishment Clause.35 To this end, it
adopted a per se rule of constitutionality for religious expression which is "(1)
purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or designated public forum, pub-
licly announced and open to all on equal terms."']
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on Lamb's Chapel and
Widmar, noting that in both it rejected identical Establishment Clause defenses
because of the variety of the forum's uses, the lack of direct sponsorship of
the questioned activity, and the incidental benefit conferred upon the particular
religious group.352 Despite the obvious similarities, the Board forced the
341. Id. at 1188.
342. Id. at 1186-88.
343. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 30 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 1994).
344. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2445.
345. Id. at 2440.
346. Id. at 2445.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 2446.
349. Id. In the absence of such an interest, the Board could only impose reasonable time,
place, and manner restriction. Id.
350. Id. at 2446-50.
351. Id. at 2450.
352. Id. at 2447.
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Court to address one distinguishing characteristic-the Square's proximity to
the statehouse.353 In essence, the Board maintained the Court should find the
restriction constitutional because observers could conceivably mistake the
Klan's expression as a religious message supported and endorsed by the
state.354 The Court in response noted simply, "We find it peculiar to say that
government promotes or favors a religious display by giving it the same ac-
cess to a public forum that all other displays enjoy.
'355
The plurality opinion sparked a variety of responses. Although Justice
Thomas agreed with and joined in the plurality's opinion, he wrote separately
to denote that the Klan's expression was essentially and indisputably political
rather than religious." 6 Nonetheless, because the Board presented an Estab-
lishment Clause defense, the Court decided the case applying Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.357 In contrast, O'Connor, who did not join the plurali-
ty, emphasized her discontent with the plurality's characterization of the ap-
propriate jurisprudential standard and its adoption of a per se rule.358 In addi-
tion, she believed it important that the display bear a sign disclaiming govern-
ment sponsorship of the exhibit.359
For his part, Souter wrote to degrade the per se rule, which he character-
ized as an irrebuttable presumption, and to reinforce the perhaps forgotten
ability of the Board to ban all unattended displays in the Square.3" Another
apparent danger Souter feared was that while on the Square the cross "would
have been the only private display on the public plot."36' Despite the Board's
legitimate apprehensions, however, Souter felt its response inappropriate.362
Rather than simply banishing the display altogether, Souter argued, the Board
should either have required the Klan to post a disclaimer or banned all un-
attended displays from the square.363 Because it opted for neither of these
alternatives, it could not in good faith claim the display endorsed any religious
message inherent in the Klan's cross. 6"
In dissent, Justice Stevens advocated a bright-line rule which "created a
strong presumption against the installation of unattended religious symbols on
public property." '365 Stevens considered the unattended displays in Capitol
Square to be of a fundamentally different nature than the private speakers in
both Lamb's Chapel and Widmar.36 Unattended displays inherently convey a
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id. The Court further distinguished Allegheny County and Lynch, two previous display
cases the Board relied upon, by noting that those cases involved, respectively, unequal access to
the forum and a display which did not endorse religion. Id. at 2448.
356. Id. at 2450 (Thomas, J., concurring).
357. Id. at 2447-50.
358. Id. at 2451, 2454 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
359. Id. at 2453.
360. Id. at 2457, 2459 (Souter, J., concurring in part).
361. Id. at 2461.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 2461-62.
364. Id. at 2462.
365. Id. at 2464 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
366. Id. at 2471.
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message which, unlike oral speech, cannot be disassociated from the state, and
in fact can be reasonably perceived as state endorsement of the expression.
Indeed, "when a statue or some other freestanding, silent, unattended immove-
able structure-regardless of its particular message-appears on the lawn of
the Capitol building, the reasonable observer must identify the State either as
the messenger, or at the very least, as one who has endorsed the mes-
sage. ' '367 Hence, in Stevens's view, a public body which permitted any group
to erect unattended religious displays on public property violated the funda-
mental principles enshrined in the Establishment Clause.
Problems abound in Stevens's approach. Foremost among these is its
hostility towards religious speech. For example, under Stevens's framework,
only unattended religious displays are prohibited. Exhibits erected for any
other motive, no matter how unpopular or distasteful, are allowed. This result
is rendered even more absurd when one considers the preeminent protection
afforded religious expression under the Free Exercise Clause. Yet Stevens
would bestow upon the state the power to exclude "unattended symbols when
they convey a type of message with which the state does not wish to be iden-
tified." Perhaps Stevens overlooks that the First Amendment protects all
speech, not simply that which happens to conform with a given public body's
perception of the appropriate. At one point, Stevens noted, "I think it obvious,
for example, that Ohio could prohibit certain categories of signs or symbols in
Capitol Square-erotic exhibits, commercial advertising, and perhaps cam-
paign posters as well-without violating the Free Exercise Clause."'  In
short, Stevens attempted singlehandedly to relegate a vital facet of private
religious speech "to a realm heretofore inhabited only by sexually explicit
displays and commercial speech.""37 As Scalia pointedly concluded, however,
"It will be a sad day when this Court casts piety in with pornography, and
finds the First Amendment more hospitable to private expletives than to pri-
vate prayers." '
367. Id. at 2467.
368. Id. at 2468.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 2449.
371. Id. Professor Rodney Blackmun describes why protection of religious speech is critical to
American democracy:
Religious discourse is a form of speech, and religious activity and practice, even if not
considered forms of speech, are found in primitive and advanced states alike. The reason
why religious activity is so ubiquitous is because it fills needs. Humans tend to seek
answers to ultimate questions: Why am I here? What is the meaning of life? How
should I relate to other living creatures and nature itself? How did life develop? How
should I act? Is there any life to which I can aspire that transcends this earthly one? Is it
an innate aspect of the human psyche to engage in religious speculation, or is it a reflec-
tion of our collective state of ignorance that will become stated in time when science
can supply more answers to basic questions? Either way, the centrality of religious
thought and practice to much of humankind cannot be easily denied. If our democratic
state is to exist for the fulfillment of human needs, then this religious expression and
practice must be regarded as a very important value to be protected along with other
forms of speech.
Rodney J. Blackmun, Showing the Fly the Way Out of the Fly-Bottle: Making Sense of the First
Amendment Religion Clauses, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 285, 287-88 (1994).
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B. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia372
Rosenberger, unlike Capitol Square, involved a novel Establishment
Clause issue: whether a university which provided payments to outside con-
tractors for various student group expenses could refuse payment because a
student paper "primarily promot[ed] or manifest[ed] a particular belie[f] in or
about a deity or ultimate reality." '373 Perhaps Justice O'Connor best character-
ized the dilemma confronting the court as one "at the intersection of the prin-
ciple of government neutrality and the prohibition on state funding of religious
activities."""
The University of Virginia (University), in an attempt to "enhance the
University environment," '375 allowed various student groups to apply for
funding distributed from the Student Activities Fund (SAF), which was com-
prised and replenished by a mandatory fee of $14 per student per semes-
ter.376 University guidelines charged the student council with responsibility
for distributing SAF resources, and further required that in lieu of direct pay-
ments to the particular student groups, the council should reimburse the
group's creditors directly. 77 Funding, however, was not automatic. In fact,
only those groups who first obtained CIO, or Contracted Independent Organi-
zation status, were eligible for consideration.37 Importantly, University poli-
cy excluded religious organizations from achieving CIO status.379
In 1990, Rosenberger, the complainant, formed Wide Awake Productions,
or WAP, to publish a school paper dedicated to "challeng[ing] Christians to
live, in word and deed, according to the faith they proclaim and to encourage
students to consider what a personal relationship with Jesus Christ means. '"380
Despite this mission, the University awarded WAP CIO status, evidencing it
did not consider WAP a religious organization.38' Nonetheless, the Appropri-
ations Committee, as did all subsequent University bodies, denied WAP's re-
quest that $5862 be paid to its printer for expenses associated with printing its
publication. 32 The committee based its denial on WAP's University prohibit-
ed status as a religious activity in that "the newspaper promoted or manifested
a particular belief in or about an ultimate deity."3 3 Unwilling to be subjected
to what he considered blatant religious discrimination, Rosenberger (and
WAP) filed suit in district court, alleging violations of their free speech, free
press, and free exercise rights, as well as their right to equal protection of the
law.3"4 The district court entered summary judgment against WAP, citing the
372. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
373. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2513.
374. Id. at 2525 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
375. Id. at 2514.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 2414-15.
378. Id. at 2514.
379. Id. at 2515.
380. Id.
381. Id. University Guidelines defined a religious organization as one "whose purpose is to
practice a devotion to an acknowledged ultimate reality or deity." Id.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 759 F. Supp. 175, 176-78 (W.D.
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Establishment Clause as a bar to releasing the funds.38 After the Fourth Cir-
cuit affirmed, Rosenberger filed for and was granted certiorari. In a narrow 5-
4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed.
The majority, led by Justice Kennedy, characterized the SAF as a forum
for speech purposes and found that its refusal to authorize the reimbursement
was a form of invidious viewpoint discrimination." 6 In depicting the restric-
tion as one which restricted only "those student journalistic efforts with reli-
gious editorial viewpoints," the Court noted the skewing effect on the market-
place of ideas.387 To this end, the Court relied on its conclusion in Lamb's
Chapel, where it held that a school's refusal to permit a religious group access
to show a Christian film constituted viewpoint discrimination.3" In an at-
tempt to evade this already stretched Lamb's Chapel rationale, the University
asserted that funds were fundamentally different from facilities. 9 In short,
the University argued funds are scarce, facilities are not."' The Court in re-
sponse turned the University's argument on its head and remarked that under
this premise the University could engage in viewpoint discrimination in the
Lamb's Chapel context if physical space exceeded money.' Because the Es-
tablishment Clause forbad such discrimination, the University could likewise
not justify its viewpoint discrimination on economic scarcity grounds.3" Fi-
nally, the Court feared the broad sweep of the University's restriction, noting
that if pressed to its bounds it could preclude "funding of essays by hypotheti-
cal student contributors named Plato, Spinoza, and Descartes." '393 Moreover,
because the prohibition applied to atheists as well, the policy would preclude
the writings of Karl Marx, Bertrand Russell, and Jean-Paul Sartre.39' Given
these concerns, the University's refusal to allow Rosenberger and WAP to
participate in SAF funding constituted a denial of their free speech rights.395
This free speech protection, however, would be trumped if the University
could demonstrate that the Establishment Clause mandated its restriction."
Unfortunately for the school, the Court held the Establishment Clause imposed
no such prohibitions, and then characterized the SAF program as one emanat-
ing neutrality and evenhandedness.3 97 Rather than seeking to advance reli-
gion, the program's object was "to open a forum for speech and to support
various student enterprises, including the publication of newspapers, in recog-
nition of the diversity and creativity of student life."39 Nor, the Court
Va. 1992).
385. Id. at 182-83.
386. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2517.
387. Id. at 2517-18.
388. Id. at 2517.








397. Id. at 2521-22.
398. Id. at 2513.
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opined, could the program be construed as University endorsement of religion,
especially given the extensive measures and disclaimers the school required
CIOs to implement.'"
The final card played by the majority tendered the indisputable fact that
no funds flowed directly to WAP.00 Although the Court conceded the ex-
penditure of funds, it preferred to focus upon the nature of the benefit WAP
received. In this respect, the SAF program did not differ from one in which
the University provided eligible student groups access to its printing
services."° Indeed, when viewed in this light, religion benefitted only inci-
dentally.'
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor articulated several reasons for her
decision, noting first the independence maintained between the student groups
and the University. 3 Because school guidelines required explicit disclaim-
ers, readers of WAP were on notice that it was not a University sponsored
publication.' Second, the mechanism by which the University distributed
funds ensured no impermissible uses. 5 To this end, O'Connor characterized
the situation as analogous to one where the school simply made available on
an equal basis a printing press for student use.' Third, the numerous publi-
cations, in addition to WAP, funded by SAF served to decrease the likelihood
that readers would perceive the University as endorsing the publication's reli-
gious message. 7 Finally, O'Connor reasoned the possibility that a dissenting
student could refuse to pay into the fund protected the fee from a Free Speech
Clause challenge and ensured few disputes over the issue of religious fund-
ing."
Justice Thomas, who agreed with the Court's opinion, wrote only to dis-
agree with the dissent's historical conclusions.' In short, the dissenters, led
by Souter, offered Madison's Remonstrance as evidence that the Establishment
Clause necessitated the University's SAF restriction.4 Unfortunately, Souter
mischaracterized and distorted the Remonstrance in an attempt to render it
applicable to the issue at hand. The Remonstrance involved an assessment to
support Christian teachers; unlike the exaction upon the students here, it did
not involve using a common pool fund to bestow, on a neutral basis, benefits
to a variety of institutions without regard to secular or sectarian viewpoints.
As such, the tax which prompted the Remonstrance was of a different nature
than the "tax" imposed in Rosenberger." ' Following this historical
399. Id. at 2523.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 2524.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 2526 (O'Connor, J., concurring).




408. Id. O'Connor's emphasis on this point lacks substance, however, because there was no
mechanism through which an objecting student could receive a pro-rata reimbursement.
409. Id. at 2528 (Thomas, J., concurring).
410. Id. at 2535-36 (Souter, J., dissenting).
411. After discussing the Remonstrance, Souter proceeded to cite the Virginia Bill. Id. at
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discussion, the dissenters ridiculed the Court's reliance on the channel through
which the funds flowed and its characterization of the restriction as viewpoint
rather than content discrimination.2 Indeed, in Souter's mind, the Court for
the first time, and in direct contravention of convincing Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, upheld "direct core funding of core religious activities by an
arm of the state."4 3
In short, Rosenberger posed an unusual issue for decision. In this respect
many would contend Souter's dissenting opinion simply lends credence to the
homage that hard cases make bad law. Unfortunately, Rosenberger does not
fall into this category. Its facts were straightforward, the inequitable effect on
WAP obvious. Yet the dissent consisted of unrealistic and unfounded assump-
tions regarding the threat posed to religious freedom by the alleged Establish-
ment Clause breach. Even more upsetting is Souter's failure to mention the
University's unabashed double-standard with respect to funding publications of
a religious nature. In fact, nowhere does the dissent, which critically perused
WAP's publication for a Christian message, note that the "University has
provided support to The Yellow Journal, a humor magazine that has targeted
Christianity as a subject of satire, and Al-Salam, a publication 'to promote a
better understanding of Islam to the University Community."' 4 Indeed, only
Justice O'Connor recognized the Court was treading new ground and acknowl-
edged the inadequacy of strict reliance on precedent. Unlike the dissenters,
however, the majority, including O'Connor, proved willing to make an equita-
ble decision based on a thorough understanding of what government neutrality
entails.4
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
Rosenberger and Capital Square represent the culmination of the Court's
inability to delineate a workable Establishment Clause framework. In addition,
the decisions exemplify the frustration engendered between the Justices with
respect to which, if any, framework is worthy of selection and application.
Consider the legal landscape before Rosenberger and Capital Square. The
Lemon test, which was twenty-four years in the making before its explicit
adoption in 1971, was considered an unabashed failure, having lingered on
uselessly for twenty-five years after its creation. Yet despite the criticism
heaped on Lemon from courts and commentators, the Court had not expressly
2536-37. Unfortunately, he conveniently overlooked the Bill's religious presumptions and its his-
torical context as one of many Virginia laws passed by Madison and Jefferson which dabbled in
religious matters. See infra notes 488-90 and accompanying text.
412. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2544, 2549-50.
413. Id. at 2533.
414. Id. at 2527 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
415. For more detailed discussions of Rosenberger, see Ralph D. Mawdsley & Charles J.
Russo, Religion in Public Education: Rosenberger Fuels an Ongoing Debate, 103 ED. LAW REP.
13 (1995) (arguing that Rosenberger was merely the culmination of an equal access movement
that began with Widmar and included Mergens and Lamb's Chapel); David Schimmel, Discrimi-
nation Against Religious Viewpoints Prohibited in Public Colleges and Universities: An Analysis
of Rosenberger v. The University of Virginia, 102 ED. LAW REP. 911 (1995) (maintaining that
Rosenberger's legal impact upon Establishment Clause jurisprudence will be limited and narrow).
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repudiated it. Nonetheless, the Court had not applied the test in any of its
Establishment Clause decisions rendered in the last two terms. Instead, it had
simply ignored, as it for the most part did in Rosenberger and Capitol Square,
Lemon's existence. Failure to formally repudiate Lemon did not, however,
prevent the Court from continuing its dialogue over what framework should
replace the admittedly defunct Lemon test. Undoubtedly, as Capitol Square
and Rosenberger evidence, unanimity in this respect is not likely to occur in
the near future. Consider that in these two cases alone, the Justices proffered
at least three different tests: O'Connor's endorsement test, the per se test ap-
plied in Capitol Square, and the historical test of the Rehnquist, Scalia, Ken-
nedy, and Thomas wing. Although the survival of any of these tests is tenuous
and speculative at best, it at long last appears that the Justices agree that
Lemon's limited utility does not justify its continued application. In this re-
spect the following discussion traces Lemon from its inception to its demise.
The critique then turns to the educational arena, where the Court reaped the
inconsistent results sowed from its endorsement of separationism and its adop-
tion of Lemon. The reasons for these failures, inattentiveness to, and ignorance
of, history, are then discussed. In short, Lemon failed because it, like most of
the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, is based on inaccurate history.
To this end, the discussion attempts to characterize the views of Madison,
Jefferson, and the other Framers and Founders in a fair, and often overlooked,
historical light. This historical misinterpretation is itself based on the Court's
most fundamental mistake-its incorporation of the Establishment Clause and
its subsequent application to the states. This analysis proffers that the incorpo-
ration decision, and the Court's subsequent attempts to use originalist,
Framers' intent to justify its regulation of even-handed, nonpreferential state
actions with respect to religion is inapposite to the Clause's inherent federal-
ism component and is therefore the root of the Court's inability to render
equitable and historically supported Establishment Clause decisions.
A. The Failure of the Lemon Test
and the Fruitless Search for Workable Standards
The Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence is, to say the least, a
mess. Sadly, even the Justices themselves acknowledge the "hopeless disarray"
which permeates the inconsistent stack of "embarrassing" Supreme Court
Establishment Clause announcements.4 6 Much of the turmoil can be traced
to the Court's resolute adherence to the maligned Lemon test. Fortunately,
there has been in recent years a strident shift away from this jurisprudence in
which inconsistency was the only hallmark."7
416. See, e,g., Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2532 (Thomas, J., concurring); Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 639 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Note that since Everson the Court has
decided at least 140 Establishment Clause decisions. See Stuart D. Poppel, Federalism, Fundamen-
tal Fairness, and the Religion Clauses, 25 CLIMB. L. REv. 247 (1995).
417. In Aguillard, Justice Scalia had the following to say about the effect of Lemon upon the
Court's Establishment Clause doctrine:
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, the ringleader of the Lemon malcontents, initiated
the shift away from the historically baseless test in 1985. There, in Wallace v.
Jaffree,4 s he voiced discontent with both the purpose and entanglement
prongs. The purpose element, he noted, was particularly useless given the
Court's acceptance of virtually every legislature's proffered secular
purpose." 9 Such pretextual inquires unnecessarily tempted legislators to sim-
ply express a secular purpose so as to ensure compliance with the purpose
prong. 420 In contrast, the entanglement element created the "insoluble para-
dox" of requiring public officials to closely monitor parochial schools under
the purpose or effect prongs, yet at the same time concluded that overarching
supervision created an unconstitutional entanglement.42
Justice O'Connor, although a newcomer to the Court, also expressed
doubts about Lemon's usefulness in Wallace.422 Nonetheless, she argued for
its retention in hope that the Court could refine Lemon so as to ensure it not
only reflected accurate historical interpretation but "also proved capable of
consistent application."423 She further lobbied for adoption of her view, ex-
pressed the year before in Lynch v. Donnelly,4 4 that the "Establishment
Clause is infringed when the government makes adherence to religion relevant
to a person's standing in the political community.'" This determination,
O'Connor further asserted, required the Court to determine, under Lemon's
purpose and effect prongs, "whether government's purpose is to endorse reli-
gion and whether the statute actually conveys a message of endorsement." '426
In 1987, Scalia jumped on the anti-Lemon bandwagon by not only charac-
terizing the test as having no basis in history and yielding unprincipled
Our cases interpreting and applying the purpose test have made such a maze of the
Establishment Clause that even the most conscientious governmental officials can only
guess what motives will be held unconstitutional. We have said essentially the follow-
ing: Government may not act with the purpose of advancing religion, except when
forced to do so by the Free Exercise Clause (which is now and then); or when eliminat-
ing existing governmental hostility to religion (which exists sometimes); or even when
merely accommodating governmentally uninhibited religious practices, except that at
some point (it is unclear where) intentional accommodation results in the fostering of
religion, which is of course unconstitutional.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 636.
418. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
419. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 108 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The purpose prong posed other
problems as well. For instance, courts frequently held that the purpose prong reflected the errone-
ous assumption that the "Establishment Clause imposes a constitutional disability on religion...
rather than a protection of religious liberty." Michael S. Paulsen, Lemon Is Dead, 43 CASE W.
Ras. L. REV. 795, 801 (1993). The purpose prong thus "misleadingly implied (and many courts
thus held) that laws motivated by a desire to promote religious freedom or to accommodate reli-
gious practice automatically constitute an Establishment Clause violation." Id.
420. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 108.
421. Id. at 109. The entanglement prong was under increasing fire; in Aguilar v. Felton, Jus-
tice O'Connor boldly stated, "I question the utility of entanglement as a separate Establishment
Clause standard in most cases." Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 422 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting).
422. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 67 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
423. Id. at 69.
424. 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
425. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
426. Id.
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results,"' but also by advocating that the Court abandon the purpose element
entirely.4 5 By the time the Court decided Lamb's Chapel six years later,
Scalia, and Thomas and Rehnquist along with him, were advocating that the
Court scrap Lemon completely.429 To this extent, Scalia forcefully advised, "I
will decline to apply Lemon-whether it validates or invalidates the govern-
ment action in question-and therefore cannot join the opinion of the Court
today."43 His remarks regarding Lemon were justifiably hostile:
The secret of the Lemon test's survival, I think, is that it is so
easy to kill. It is there to scare us (and our audience) when we wish it
to do so, but we can command it to return to the tomb at will. When
we wish to strike down a practice it forbids, we invoke it; when we
wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely. Sometimes
we take a middle course, calling its three prongs "no more than help-
ful signposts." Such a docile and useful monster is worth keeping
around, at least in a somnolent state; one never knows when one
might need him.43" '
Indeed, as Scalia noted, a majority of the current Justices had personally
condemned the test in one form or another, but the Court as a whole, despite
numerous opportunities, had never specifically repudiated it.432
The 1994 Kiryas Joel decision marked the turning point in the efforts of
Rehnquist, Thomas, Kennedy, Scalia, and O'Connor to rid Establishment
Clause jurisprudence from Lemon's sour effects. Although the Court did not,
and has not, specifically countenanced that Lemon's days are over, it has not
applied the test in any case decided since 1993. In Kiryas Joel, only Justice
Blackmun clung to the principles enunciated in Lemon.433
This trend away from Lemon continued in 1995 in both Rosenberger and
Capitol Square. Noticeably, the Capitol Square plurality (Rehnquist, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas) applied neither Lemon nor O'Connor's increasingly
popular endorsement test. Rather, it created the per se rule described above.
Not surprisingly, O'Connor, joined by Souter and Breyer, advocated the en-
dorsement test. In the unattended display context, O'Connor argued, endorse-
ment would occur if a reasonable observer, knowledgeable of the "history and
context of the community and the forum in which the religious display
exists," 3 would believe the display to be endorsed by the state. Justice
427. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
428. Id. at 640.
429. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2149 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
430. Id. at 2150.
431. Id. (citations omitted).
432. Id.
433. Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2494-
95 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Scalia, while disagreeing with the Court's Kiryas Joel decision,
wholeheartedly supported its "snub" of the Lemon test. Id. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He
correctly pointed out, however, the difficulties the Court imposes by not specifically denouncing
the test. For example, the Kiryas Joel parties produced over 80 pages of briefs devoted solely to
the test's principles. Id.
434. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2455.
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Stevens also applied the endorsement test but differed with O'Connor over the
proper level of knowledge the Court should attribute to the reasonable observ-
er.
435
The Rosenberger Court, like the Capitol Square Court, was dominated by
the Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas wing. Hence it ignored both
Lemon and the endorsement test, which O'Connor loyally and steadfastly
defended.436 Instead, Justice Kennedy characterized the necessary inquiry as
"one into the purpose and object of the governmental action in question
and ... into the practical details of the program's operations."437 Kennedy's
opinion also emanated nonpreferentialist tendencies, noting at one point that
"the apprehensions of our predecessor involved the levying of taxes upon the
public for the sole and exclusive purpose of establishing and supporting spe-
cific sects." '438 To this end, the Souter dissent, perhaps too secure in the
Court's historical separationism, admonished that the nonpreferential battle
was waged and lost long ago.439 Perhaps Souter is ignorant to the Scalia
wing's intent to replace separationism with nonpreferentialism. In any event, it
will be neither Scalia nor Souter, but O'Connor who will determine the direc-
tion of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence."0
The very real possibility is that regardless of the test applied, Establish-
ment Clause cases will inevitably yield inconsistent decisions. Sadly, even a
Supreme Court Justice has admitted that the only guiding source in this juris-
prudential area is the Justices' personal and political views."' One commen-
tator reaches precisely this result:
If the Court should repudiate the test ... it would surely employ
similar considerations .... Moreover, tests have little to do with
decisions; the use of a test lends the appearance of objectivity to a
judicial opinion, but no evidence shows that a test influences a mem-
ber of the Court to reach a decision he or she would not have reached
without that test. And Justices using the same test often arrive at
contradictory results. 2
435. Id. at 2466 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
436. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2526.
437. Id. at 2521.
438. Id. at 2522.
439. Id. at 2537 n.1 (Souter, J., dissenting).
440. As Rosenberger depicts, Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas will continue to sup-
port nonpreferentialism; likewise, Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer are undoubtedly
separationist. Hence, O'Connor and her endorsement test will tack the Court's Establishment
Clause future. Note that O'Connor's endorsement tests are, for the most part, well received by
scholars. For a critique of the test, see Matthew S. Steffey, The Establishment Clause and the
Lessons of Context, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 775 (1995) (maintaining that the endorsement test is correct
in its focus on the context of the dispute).
441. Justice Jackson observed:
It is idle to pretend that this task is one for which we can find in the Constitution one
word to help us as judges to decide where the secular ends and the sectarian begins
.... Nor can we find guidance in any other legal source. It is a matter on which we can
find no law but our own prepossessions.
McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 237-38 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring)
442. LEVY, supra note 9, at 156.
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In this respect, consider that even though the bell has tolled for Lemon, dis-
putes are already arising over the scope of the endorsement test."3
B. The Education Mess
1. Private Education
Nowhere has the effects of the Court's inability to articulate a standard
been more profound than in the sphere of education. Consider that the Court
decided many of these cases before it delineated the Lemon test. As such, it
was forced to conform or distinguish those pre-Lemon decisions once it articu-
lated the Lemon test. Moreover, education cases crop up with such frequency
that in many instances the Court has not even applied the Lemon test when
resolving an Establishment Clause dispute over education. In short, the dis-
putes have outlived the test that was designed to resolve them. The result is a
sphere of Establishment Clause jurisprudence which is distorted and filled with
meaningless distinctions.
This unfortunate byproduct is especially true in the context of aid to paro-
chial schools, where time and again the Court has reiterated that the Establish-
ment Clause permits incidental benefits and does not preclude religious
schools and their students from partaking in neutral government benefit pro-
grams. Yet even a cursory analysis of its decisions belies this assertion. Con-
sider in this respect Chief Justice Rehnquist's lengthy but pointed summary of
the Court's aid to parochial school decisions:
[A] State may lend to parochial school children geography textbooks
that contain certain maps of the United States, but the State may not
lend maps of the United States for use in geography class. A State
may lend textbooks on American colonial history, but it may not lend
a film on George Washington, or a film projector to show it in his-
tory class. A State may lend classroom workbooks, but may not lend
workbooks in which the parochial school children may write, thus
rendering them nonreusable. A State may pay for bus transportation
to religious schools, but may not pay for bus transportation from the
parochial school to the public zoo or natural history museum for a
field trip. A State may pay for diagnostic services conducted in the
parochial school but therapeutic services must be given in a different
building; speech and hearing "services" conducted by the State inside
the sectarian school are forbidden, but the State may conduct speech
and hearing diagnostic testing services inside the sectarian school.
Exceptional parochial school students may receive counseling, but it
must take place outside of the parochial school, such as in a trailer
parked down the street. A State may give cash to a parochial school
to pay for the administration of state-written tests and state-ordered
443. Note also that Lemon still has some, if few, supporters. In this vein, see Carol F. Kagan,
Squeezing the Juice from Lemon: Toward a Consistent Test for the Establishment Clause, 22 N.
KY. L. REv. 621 (1995) (arguing that a modified Lemon test provides a suitable framework for
Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
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reporting services, but it may not provide funds for teacher-prepared
tests on secular subjects. Religious instruction may not be given in
public school, but the public school may release students during the
day for religion classes elsewhere, and may enforce attendance at
those classes with its truancy laws.'
Simply put, the Court has become mired in separationist dogma and conse-
quently lost sight of the children disadvantaged by its decisions. 5 Although
the separationist fear" is understandable, none of the above situations, con-
sidered either individually or cumulatively, bestow upon religious schools a
substantial, direct financial gain. Indeed, all the benefits Justice Rehnquist
summarized are unrelated to the schools' religious emphasis and for the most
part unadaptable to sectarian purposes."'
A second and equally divisive concern in the parochial school arena con-
stitutes the appropriateness of providing tax relief to parents of children who
attend parochial school. Undoubtedly, these parents "bear a particularly great
financial burden in educating their children."' They are not, as many claim,
double taxed, because taxes by their nature are mandatory while parochial
school attendance is not. Yet parents of parochial school children contribute
greatly to the maintenance of public schools. By contributing through taxes to
the health of the public education system but sending their children to parochi-
al schools, these parents effectively subsidize the education of public school
students. Hence, those adverse to tax credits or exemptions for parents of
parochial school students would do well to consider the resultant strain on
both the public education system and the public coffers should enrollment in
nonpublic schools vastly decline. Consider that if the number of private school
students were to decrease and the pool of public school students necessarily
increase, the per student expenditures for public school students would fall
dramatically, thereby drastically reducing the quality of public school educa-
tion. When considered in this light, the effect of a paltry tax credit, deduction,
or exemption is negligible at most.
444. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110-11 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
445. One commentator states that an unduly rigid separationism affects American society, not
just schoolchildren, in drastic ways. Lupu, supra note 188, at 279. Lupu posits, in fact, that strong
separationism favored irreligion by advocating secular rationality, which is in turn partial to a
particular set of institutions. Id. Nor "is secular rationality particularly conducive to the life of the
spirit, without which it may not be possible for a nation to thrive." Id.
446. Separationists are concerned not that religious schools will lead to a formal establishment
but rather that the more substantive and direct the aid becomes, the less the schools resemble reli-
gious schools and the more they resemble public schools which merely emphasize religion. While
one could conceive of situations where this could occur, e.g., if public funds were used to pay
religious school teacher's salaries, none of the parochial school aid cases discussed posed any real
threat of such an egregious effect.
447. Levy resolved the issue as follows: "If proper restraints exist on the funds for parochial
schools so that tax monies are not spent for religious purposes and the aid rendered is comparable
to the value of the secular education provided by the schools, fairness again seems to be on the
accommodationist side." LEVY, supra note 9, at 179.
448. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 402 (1983).
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2. Public Education
An unfortunate side effect of both the Court's rulings and strict-
separationist pressure has been the ability of overzealous public interest law-
yers" 9 to threaten school boards with litigation, and thereby frighten them
into submission and foreclose all discussion of religion in the public school
curriculum.45° This does not have to be so. The Establishment Clause prohib-
its only those interactions between public schools and religion which are de-
signed with a religious purpose to reap benefits for a religion or a religious
sect. The Establishment Clause does not and could not prohibit discussion of
religious literature or the instruction of students in subjects such as religious
history or religious philosophy-provided, that is, that such courses contain
themselves to the objective study of religion.45 Simply put, there is a differ-
ence between teaching and preaching, and it is the line separating the two that
public schools may not cross. As Justice Black so eloquently put it in
McCollum:
Music without sacred music, architecture minus the cathedral, or
painting without the scriptural themes would be eccentric and incom-
plete, even from a secular point of view. Yet the inspirational appeal
of religion in these guises is often stronger than a forthright sermon
.... Certainly a course in English literature that omitted the Bible
and other powerful uses of our mother tongue for religious ends
would be pretty barren. And I should suppose it is a proper, if not an
indispensable, part of preparation for worldly life to know the roles
that religion and religions have played in the tragic story of mankind.
The fact is that for good or for ill, nearly everything in our culture
worth transmitting, everything which gives meaning to life, is saturat-
ed with religious influences .... One can hardly respect a system of
education that would leave the student wholly ignorant of the currents
of religious thought that move the world society for a part in which
he is being prepared.452
449. Levy made the following comments regarding this problem: "The American Civil Liber-
ties Union has not always understood. Suits brought by the ACLU to have courts hold unconstitu-
tional every cooperative relationship between government and religion can damage the cause of
separation by making it look overrigid and ridiculous." LEVY, supra note 9, at 240. For an exam-
ple of overrigid absurdity, see John M. Hartenstein, A Christmas Issue: Christian Holiday Cele-
bration in the Public Elementary Schools is an Establishment of Religion, 80 CALiF. L. REV. 981
(1992), in which the author posits that, among other things, creating Christmas art and decora-
tions, singing Christmas carols, and decorating the classroom and exchanging gifts at
Christmastime, violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 1026.
450. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141,
2149 (Scalia, J., concurring).
451. See Justice Clark's majority opinion in Abbington Township, where he posits:
[I]t might well be said that one's education is not complete without a study of compara-
tive religion or the history of religion and its relationship to the advancement of civiliza-
tion. It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and historic
qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion,
when presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be effect-
ed consistently with the First Amendment.
Abbington Township, 374 U.S. at 225.
452. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 236 (1948).
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Yet one has to wonder how many students at any level of public educa-
tion have a basic understanding of the tenets and the history of the major
religions. So long as comparative religious studies are ignored, then students
in public schools will not only be indoctrinated with distorted history but also
possess a fundamental lack of understanding regarding the advancement of
civilization.453 Moreover, failure to emphasize secular courses in comparative
religion and religious history may aid in the production of generations of
children who possess no moral code.454 While it is certainly not a function of
public education to indoctrinate children with religion, it is the sad realism that
if public schools do not attempt to provide pupils with moral guidance and
some semblance of a framework for resolving moral dilemmas and making
moral choices, then many students will never receive such instruction. Al-
though the study of morality may be attempted and perhaps accomplished
without a discussion of how various religions approach moral problems, it is
indisputably not complete without such discourse." It is this function which
the objective study of religion best serves.456
453. For a similar conclusion, see Warren A. Nord, Religion, the First Amendment, and Pub-
lic Education, 8 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 439 (1994), where the author states:
There are, however, good secular, liberal reasons for requiring the study of religion in
the public schools.
A liberal education must avoid indoctrination. We indoctrinate when we system-
atically avoid giving students the intellectual and imaginative resources to make sense of
competing interpretations of contested matters.... [A] good deal of what we teach stu-
dents-about history, nature, morality, and human nature-is religiously contested, yet
students are taught virtually nothing about religious interpretations of these contested
matters. In this respect, public education is strikingly illiberal; public education indoctri-
nates students against religion.
Id. at 439.
454. Consider in this regard, Justice Jackson's dissent in Everson. There, he stated that our
public school system
is organized on the premise that secular education can be isolated from all religious
teaching so that the school can inculcate all needed temporal knowledge and also main-
tain a strict and lofty neutrality as to religion. The assumption is that after the individual
has been instructed in worldly wisdom he will be better fitted to choose his religion.
Everson, 330 U.S. at 23-24. Jackson's assumptions are unrealistic. Religious views, as are most
others, are usually developed during childhood and adolescence. It is highly unlikely that one who
has no concept of either the function of religion or an understanding of the major world religions,
will, upon completion of secular studies, be better fitted to choose his religion.
455. Unfortunately, this is the alternative currently in favor. One author explains the inconsis-
tencies between this view's supporters and their justification-liberal neutrality-for supporting
this view, as follows:
This is the phenomenon of selective multi-culturalism: boundless tolerance and
respect for some voices, and ruthless suppression of others.
The effect of selective post-modernism is to allow secular ideologies to use politi-
cal muscle to advance their causes, including using the public schools to inculcate their
ideals, without even the psychological constraint of liberal neutrality, but at the same
time to preserve liberal formalism in court to ensure that religion is not included in the
public dialogue. Thus, in New York City the children are read Heather Has Two Mom-
mies in the first grade and given information on anal intercourse in the sixth; but, as the
Tenth Circuit recently held, The Bible in Pictures must be removed from the shelf of the
first grade classroom library.
Michael W. McConnell, "God Is Dead and We Have Killed Him!": Freedom of Religion in the
Post-Modern Age, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 163, 187-88.
456. Note that such a study would not be complete without discussing the option of irreligion,
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Fear of Establishment Clause litigation has also chilled the willingness of
legislatures and school districts to authorize moments of silence, which, con-
trary to popular belief, the Court has not deemed unconstitutional. In fact, the
very Court that declared unconstitutional the Alabama statute in Wallace v.
Jaffree remarked that "[t]he legislative intent to return prayer to the public
schools, is of course, quite different from merely protecting every student's
right to engage in voluntary prayer during an appropriate moment of silence
during the schoolday."4 7 In that same case, Justice Powell agreed fully with
Justice O'Connor's assertion, which stated:
Nothing in the United States Constitution as interpreted by this Court
or in the laws of the State of Alabama prohibits public school stu-
dents from voluntarily praying at any time before, during or after the
schoolday. Alabama has facilitated voluntary silent prayers of stu-
dents who are so inclined by enacting [a law] which provides a mo-
ment of silence in appellees' schools each day. The parties to these
proceedings concede the validity of this enactment.45
Hence, states are free to authorize moments of silence provided they do not,
explicitly in the statute or its history, or as applied through teachers, encourage
students to use the moment for prayer. Because moment of silence statutes do
not aid, even incidentally, religion or religious sects, or favor religion over
irreligion, they should withstand Establishment Clause challenges. Similarly,
because moments of silence possess no coercive element sufficient to trigger a
Free Exercise Clause attack, they constitute a workable compromise between
mandatory school prayer and perceived separationist hostility towards religion.
Indeed, as Justice O'Connor noted in Wallace, "It is difficult to discern a
serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thoughtful schoolchil-
dren.
'459
In short, the Supreme Court's attempt to micromanage the smallest influ-
ence of religion in the nation's public schools has proved disastrous. Instead of
recognizing that cultural and religious practices vary by locale, it has imposed
a single standard by which it measures every state practice touching religion.
Rather than attempting to understand and compensate for these innumerable
differences, however, the Court should return to local school districts and state
legislatures control over its public school curriculum. If nothing else, Kiryas
Joel stands as a reminder of what happens when the Court interferes in effec-
tive local solutions to solely local problems.' Concerning the Court's over-
sight of public schools, a perceptive Justice once posited, "However wise this
Court may be or may become hereafter, it is doubtful that, sitting in Washing-
ton, it can successfully supervise and censor the curriculum of every public
or atheism, which like religion proffers an outlook on life and offers a method of moral problem
solving.
457. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59 (1985).
458. Id. at 67 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
459. id. at 73. Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, remarked that he would add to O'Connor's
statement, "even if they choose to pray." Id. at 90 (Burger, J., dissenting). He then quoted sarcasti-
cally from Horace, "The mountains have labored and brought forth a mouse." Id.
460. See supra notes 260-75 and accompanying text.
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school in every hamlet and city in the United States. I doubt that our wisdom
is so nearly infallible. ' ' 6
C. (Mis)Interpreting Framers' Intent
The Supreme Court's entire Establishment Clause jurisprudence, including
its ill-fated Lemon test, is grounded in its separationist interpretation of
Framer's intent. Unfortunately, a person reading the Supreme Court's Estab-
lishment Clause opinions would presume first that Madison and Jefferson
opposed any governmental support, be it state or national, of religion, and
second, that no other Founder or Framer expressed any views on the matter.
While correct to an extent, such unnecessarily broad statements are mislead-
ing. Although Madison and Jefferson were strong advocates of separation of
church and state, neither adhered to, or practiced while in public office, an
overly rigid separation. In this respect, the Court, as well as many commenta-
tors, conveniently overlook the acts and writings of Madison and Jefferson
which either conflict with separationism or reflect a nonpreferentialist tenden-
cy. Moreover, those who overemphasize Madison's Remonstrance and
Jefferson's Danbury letter and Virginia Bill for Religious Freedom inadver-
tently simplify Madison's and Jefferson's church-state jurisprudence.
1. Madison
Consider in this respect that the Remonstrance is only one of many docu-
ments of a religious nature penned by Madison. In fact, only four years after
writing the Remonstrance, Madison drafted the Bill of Rights, including, of
course, the Establishment Clause. His first draft, which was not adopted, read
as follows: "The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious
belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the
full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, in-
fringed." 2 Although critics rightly dismiss this initial version as insignifi-
cant in determining the collective intent of the Framers, it serves one crucial
purpose: as the sole product of Madison, it is demonstrative of his, and only
his, intent at the time he introduced it. 3 Because Madison was unsure
whether the House would adopt his proposed amendment wholesale, the asser-
tion that it fails to reflect his intent is illogical.' Clearly, Madison's first
proposal manifested a fundamental concern with prohibiting the national gov-
ernment from establishing a national religion. 5
461. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 114 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
462. ADAMS & EMMEICH, supra note 19, at 17.
463. See CORD, supra note 8, at 26.
464. Id.
465. Levy states that nonpreferentialist assertions that Madison meant only a national church
when adopting the amendment are groundless. LEVY, supra note 9, at 123. Levy's claim belies the
available legislative history. While Madison may certainly have intended more, the scant history
and all the debate indicate that Madison, and the other Framers for that matter, were concerned
with national establishments. As will be shown, however, this does not mean Madison's views can
be characterized as nonpreferential.
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Other acts and documents further demonstrate that Madison developed not
a simple separationist viewpoint, but a complex church-state jurisprudence,
which was in some instances separationist, in other instances
nonpreferentialist. For example, not only did Madison oppose including minis-
ters in the census,' but he also objected vehemently, as a member of the
Continental Congress in 1785, to an attempt by that Congress to reserve, in
the Northwest Ordinance, public land for religious use throughout townships in
the western territories." Despite these undoubtedly separationist acts, Madi-
son later served on the Congress committee that authorized congressional
chaplains. '  Moreover, as a member of that same Congress, Madison never
objected to a proclamation for a day of thanksgiving to allow "the people of
the United States a day of public thanksgiving and prayer, to be observed by
acknowledging, with grateful hearts, the many signal favors of Almighty God,
especially by affording them an opportunity to peaceably establish a Constitu-
tion of government for their safety and happiness."'
Madison's actions as the fourth President further cloud the issue. While in
office, he issued three proclamations for days of fasting and one for a day of
thanksgiving.47 Although these proclamations were undoubtedly of a reli-
gious nature, Madison nonetheless vetoed two different bills concerning reli-
gious matters. The first involved a congressional attempt to reserve federal
land for a Baptist church which, because of a surveying error, had constructed
its building upon federal land.47' Congress's solution summarily granted the
land to the church. '72 Madison, however, objected to the transaction and ve-
toed the bill because it "comprise[d] a principle and precedent for the appro-
priation of funds of the United States for the use of and support of religious
societies, contrary to the article of the Constitution which declares that 'Con-
gress shall make no law respecting a religious establishment."'473 The second
bill Madison vetoed an attempt by Congress to incorporate an Episcopal
church in the District of Columbia. 74 Despite these vetoes, Madison ap-
proved chaplains for the armed forces,47 an action entirely inconsistent with
466. Id. at 130. To this end, he stated that with regard to those
employed in teaching and inculcating the duties of religion, there may be some indel-
icacy in singling them out, as the general government is proscribed from interfering, in
any manner whatsoever, in matters respecting religion; and it may be thought to do this,
in ascertaining who, and who are not ministers of the gospel.
Id.
467. Id. at 129. Madison voiced this opposition in a letter in which he stated, "How a regula-
tion, so unjust in itself, so foreign to the Authority of Congress ... and smelling so strongly of an
antiquated Bigotry, could have received the countenance of a Committee is truly a matter of aston-
ishment." Id. at 129-30. Notwithstanding Madison's admonitions, the Northwest Ordinance includ-
ed a provision reading, "Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government
and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged."
CORD, supra note 8, at 61.
468. CORD, supra note 8, at 25.
469. Id. at 28.
470. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 25.
471. LEVY, supra note 9, at 119.
472. Id.
473. Id.
474. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 25.
475. LEVY, supra note 9, at 121.
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the views expressed in his Baptist church land grant veto that no appropriation
of government funds could be used to support religion.
Taken together, it is at the least difficult, if not impossible, to assimilate
this mass of writings and acts and produce a definitive, comprehensive state-
ment of Madison's intent with respect to church and state. Fortunately, one of
Madison's own writings, entitled the "Detached Memoranda,"476 clarifies
much of the confusion. Although Madison wrote the Detached Memoranda
after the end of his political career in 1817, it remained undiscovered until
1946, when it was found in the family papers of William C. Rives.4" In the
Memoranda, Madison took a very broad view of the Establishment Clause,
contending that thanksgiving day proclamations, other religious proclamations,
and congressional chaplains all violate the Constitution. He articulated this as
follows:
Is the appointment of Chaplains to the two houses of Congress
consistent with the Constitution, and with the pure principle of reli-
gious freedom?
In strictness the answer on both points must be in the negative.
The Constitution of the U.S. forbids anything like an establishment of
a national religion. The law appointing Chaplains establishes a reli-
gious worship for the national representatives, to be performed by
Ministers of religion, elected by a majority of them; and these are to
be paid out of the national taxes. Does not this involve the principle
of a national establishment, applicable to a provision for a religious
worship for the Constituent as well as of the representative Body,
approved by the majority, and conducted by Ministers of religion paid
out by the entire nation.
The establishment of the chaplainship to Congress is a palpable
violation of equal rights, as well as of Constitutional principles
478
This portion of the Memoranda denotes two important points. First, Madi-
son believed the Constitution forbad more than just establishments of religion.
As stated above, he construed the Constitution to prohibit "anything like an
establishment of religion." Second, despite his presidential proclamations and
his membership on the committee that approved the congressional chaplains,
he considered them unconstitutional. It is unclear, however, whether he consid-
ered the above issues and actions unconstitutional at the time he made the
proclamations and appointments, or whether these views developed over the
course of three decades and were ultimately embodied in the Memoranda. The
evidence dictates that it must be the latter. It is unlikely that the same Madison
who spoke out vehemently against legislative proposals regarding religion
would meekly submit without objection to the proposal of chaplains had he
476. James Madison, untitled manuscript, reprinted in Elizabeth Fleet, Madison's 'Detached
Memoranda', 3 WM. & MARY Q. 534, 535-68 (1946).
477. CORD, supra note 8, at 29. The document was purportedly in Madison's handwriting and
authentic. Id.
478. Madison, supra note 476, at 558.
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thought them unconstitutional.479 The same can be said of the Madison who
issued thanksgiving day and other religious proclamations while President, but
who in the Memoranda asserted that presidential proclamations of this nature
were unconstitutional."0 It stretches reason to assume that Madison, the most
outspoken figurehead of the separationists for thirty years, did so, as he
claimed in a letter in 1822, for political expediency. s' Rather, it is more
likely he considered the proclamations constitutional at the time he made
them, but later changed his mind.
Although this is a subtle distinction, its meaning is crucial. If Madison
believed the acts constitutional when drafting the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights and while serving as President, then as Cord states, "Madison should
be judged on his behavior, statements, and actions while he was a public ser-
vant in the House and in the Presidency, making policy and accountable for
it.",1 2 To the extent one attempts to discern the intent of Madison as a Fram-
er this is correct. Note that even if Madison, as a public servant, considered
the proclamations and appointments unconstitutional, no evidence exists to
suggest the majority of the remaining Framers shared this view and enshrined
it in the First Amendment. Certainly when one considers Madison's intent on
a singular rather than a collective level, the Detached Memoranda makes un-
mistakably clear that Madison, after contemplating the matter for many years,
concluded that religious proclamations, congressional chaplains, and any other
legislation 3 concerning religion should be unconstitutional. In other words,
if Madison believed that proclamations and chaplains were constitutional when
he approved them, then when using Madison as a barometer of original
Framers' intent, commentators should not rely on his later, more stringent
views such as those expressed in the Detached Memoranda. This is so be-
cause, as the debates evidenced, Madison was deeply involved in articulating
to the other Framers what he believed the Clauses to mean. It is not a fair
historical determination of intent to attribute to the other Framers views devel-
oped by Madison after the framing. Those views are relevant only to the ex-
tent that they are used to ascertain Madison's intent apart from the other
Framers, i.e., his individual church-state jurisprudence which only developed
into the strict views expressed in the Memoranda nearly thirty years after the
Constitution and Bill of Rights were framed.
2. Jefferson
Unlike Madison, whose works other than the Remonstrance have been
simply ignored, the works of Jefferson have been unabashedly misinterpreted,
and none more so than the fabled Virginia Bill for Religious Freedom." Al-
479. See CORD, supra note 8, at 32-33.
480. LEVY, supra note 9, at 123.
481. CORD, supra note 8, at 31.
482. Id. at 36.
483. In the Detached Memoranda, Madison also indicated, by way of an example in Ken-
tucky, his opposition to attempts to exempt churches from taxes. Madison, supra note 476, at 555.
484. This is not to suggest that courts and scholars have not ignored those acts and writings
of Jefferson which are inconsistent with the view adopted by that court or scholar, but rather that
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though the Supreme Court has alluded to this Bill on many occasions for
support of Jefferson's intent, it has severed the Bill from its historical context
and manipulated its intention and effect. Consider, for example, the Court's
sweeping assumption in Everson that the ideas expressed in the Virginia Bill
were not merely consistent with, but embodied and were in fact the same as
the provisions later enshrined in the First Amendment. 5 This assumption
effectively renders irrelevant the experiences and intent not only of every
Framer not involved in the Virginia struggle, but also of every state but Vir-
ginia. In fact, the Bill has no bearing whatsoever on the intent of the Framers
with respect to the Establishment Clause. It was passed by the Virginia legisla-
ture before the Establishment Clause even existed. Moreover, even had the
Clause existed, the Bill would be virtually irrelevant. Because the Establish-
ment Clause concerns only the national government, the state governments,
including Virginia's, were free to deal with religion as they so chose. Hence,
to this end the Bill's only interpretive use is as a barometer of
Jefferson's-and to a great extent, Madison's-impressions of the appropriate
church and state relationship. 6 Note that Jefferson's noninvolvement in the
framing of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights further decreases the Virgin-
ia Bill's utility as a reflection of the Establishment Clause."7
Jefferson was more consistent, although not entirely consistent, than Madison with respect to his
actions regarding religion while serving as a public official. For example, as President, Jefferson
demonstrated a separationist bent when he broke with the proclamation tradition instituted by
Washington and Adams, and refused to issue pronouncements for days of thanksgiving and na-
tional prayer. CORD, supra note 8, at 40. He explained his reasons in a letter to a Presbyterian
clergyman:
I consider the government of the United States as interdicted by the Constitution
from intermeddling with religious institutions, their doctrines, disciplines, or exercises.
This results not only from the provision that no law shall be made respecting the estab-
lishment or free exercise of religion, but from that also which reserves to the States the
powers not delegated to the United States. Certainly no power to prescribe any religious
exercise, or to assume authority in religious discipline, has been delegated to the general
government. It must then rest with the States, as far as it can be in any human authority.
Id. Although Jefferson's letter reveals his belief that presidential religious proclamations conflicted
with the Religion Clauses, it also underscores his objections to the proclamations on federalism
grounds. Id. Hence, even in the absence of the Religion Clauses, Jefferson would not have issued
any religious proclamations.
Notwithstanding Jefferson's break with tradition, he signed into law three extensions of an
act which purported to, among other things, "regulate the grants of land appropriated ... for the
society of the United Brethren for propagating the gospel among the heathen." Id. at 45. Jefferson
further sought and received congressional approval of a treaty with the Kaskaskia Indians contin-
gent upon the national government using federal funds to support a Catholic priest and assist the
tribe in constructing a church. Id. at 38.
485. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947).
486. Not all commentators agree. For example, Richard Morgan concludes that Madison's
Remonstrance set the stage for the Virginia Bill which in turn led to development of a "secularist
theory of religious freedom and separation of church and state which within a few short years
came to underpin and inform the religion clauses of the new First Amendment." MORGAN,
supra note 76, at 18. The deficiency in this view, however, is that not all the Framers of the First
Amendment participated in drafting either Madison's Remonstrance or the Virginia Bill for Reli-
gious Liberty. Thus, Morgan's view belittles the views and intent of those nonparticipating Fram-
ers.
487. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted the irrationality of the Court's heavy reliance on Jefferson
by stating, "He would seem to any detached observer as a less than ideal source of contemporary
history as to the meaning of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment." Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Courts and commentators also have conveniently overlooked the historical
context overlaying the Bill. Again, Everson serves as an example. There, Jus-
tice Rutledge opened his dissent by quoting the preamble to Jefferson's Vir-
ginia Bill and proceeded to state, "I cannot believe that the great author of
those words, or the men who made them law, could have joined in this deci-
sion."''  Rutledge was wrong. He either ignored or was not aware that Jef-
ferson, Madison, and all the rest of the Virginia Bill supporters passed statutes
much more entangled with religion than the one at issue in Everson. Indeed,
passage of the Bill was part of a "comprehensive revision of Virginia's laws,
which included: A Bill for Punishing Disturbers of Religious Worship and
Sabbath Breakers; A Bill for Appointing Days of Public Fasting and Thanks-
giving; and A Bill Annulling Marriages Prohibited by the Levitical Law, and
Appointing the Mode of Solemnizing Lawful Marriage."' 9 Clearly, these
bills dabbled not only in religious subjects modem courts would unhesitatingly
label unconstitutional, but also on subjects much more pervasively supportive
of religion than simply busing children to and from religious schools. Yet the
very legislature that passed the Bill for Religious Freedom passed these bills
as well.4'
Finally, consider the religious nature of the Bill, which instead of being
neutral as regards religion, presumed a belief in God.49 Because of modem
separationist dogma with respect to any law which espouses a religious prefer-
ence, those courts which have historically touted the Bill's grandeur would be
required to strike it down should a state enact it today.492 The absurdity of
this belies both common sense and the Constitution.
Modem courts, in their quest for separationist support, have interposed
their misunderstanding of history upon the Virginia Bill. Undoubtedly,
488. Everson, 330 U.S. at 29 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
489. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 23-24.
490. Note that the separationists are not alone in their misinterpretation of history. Consider,
for example, the opinion of Justice Thomas in Rosenberger, where his historical assessment, al-
though more accurate than Souter's, was not flawless. Admittedly, he understood the underlying
nature and limitations of both the Remonstrance and the Virginia Bill. For example, he correctly
noted that Madison objected not to religious participation in neutral government programs but to a
specific tax imposed solely for the benefit of Christian teachers. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2529 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). Nonetheless, Thomas
proceeded to adopt a nonpreferentialist view, and unfortunately based this conclusion in part on
Madison's Remonstrance. Id. at 2529-30. Although Thomas correctly assumed Madison sought to
prevent the national govemment from establishing a national church, he failed to mention
Madison's Detached Memoranda, which clearly foreclosed any nonpreferentialist assumptions
regarding Madison's church and state jurisprudence. Indeed, it is these uninformed oversights that
reduce the credibility of Thomas's opinion. Consider also Thomas's discussion of the historical
support for excluding churches from property taxes. Id. at 2531. In this section, Madison's name
is nowhere to be found, yet in the Detached Memoranda he explicitly indicated his opposition to
such exemptions. Perhaps sensing the incompatibility of Madison's views with his own, Thomas
rightly remarked that "the views of one man do not establish the original understanding of the
First Amendment." Id. at 2530. In short, Thomas should have ended his historical appraisal upon
correctly concluding that "there is no indication that at the time of the framing [Madison] took the
dissent's view that the government must discriminate against religious adherents by excluding
them from more generally available government financial subsidies." Id.
491. Dreisbach, supra note 56, at 187.
492. See id. at 188 (citing American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 136
(7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J. dissenting)).
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Jefferson supported separation of church and the national government. His
refusal to issue thanksgiving and other religious day proclamations is but one
example of this conclusion. Nonetheless, Jefferson, as did Madison and every
other Framer, professed and practiced the belief that the states were free to
legislate with respect to religion.493 There were no limits on state power to
do so. The various Virginia bills pertaining to religion exemplify this federal-
ism-based precept. Furthermore, the notion that Jefferson favored a separation
of church and state is true only when considered in its historical context of
state freedoms.494 But Jefferson, and Madison for that matter, did not live in
a United States where the Supreme Court turned the Constitution inside out;
moreover, neither lived in the era of incorporation and federally imposed state
restraints. Surely, had they lived in such times, they would be most distressed
to see their tools, which were designed to ensure religious liberty, used so
spuriously and deceptively to destroy it.
3. The Lost Founders
An unfortunate byproduct of the understandable tendency of jurists and
commentators to emphasize the views of Madison and Jefferson is the corre-
sponding failure to consider the view of the other Framers and Founders.
Indeed, noticeably absent from most discussions of church and state are the
views of some of the nation's earliest and most esteemed leaders, such as
George Washington, John Adams, John Marshall, and others.495 Many of
these individuals were "political centrists," who not only "looked favorably on
organized religion as necessary for social cohesion," but also "believed that
religion was an essential cornerstone for morality, civic virtue, and democratic
government."496
493. See Poppel, supra note 416, at 250 ("In the search for the original intent of the Framers
concerning the Religion Clauses, one fact is taken as irrefutable by virtually all commentators: at
the time of the ratification of the Constitution, it was not the intention of the Framers to apply the
Religion Clauses to the States.").
494. One commentator has articulated this precept as follows:
Where the Court has gone astray in its Religion Clause jurisprudence is in using the
original intent of the Framers to justify a Religion Clause jurisprudence with respect to
First Amendment limitations on state action. The only clear "original intent" of the
Framers is that the Religion Clauses were not to apply to the states. Once the Court de-
cided to incorporate the Religion Clauses against the states, it nullified the importance of
"original intent" in this area, at least with respect to defining the limitations imposed on
the states. The grand searches for original intent seen in Everson, Wallace, and other
opinions are futile once it is understood that, while the Framers of the First Amendment
might have had an intention regarding the application of the Religion Clauses to the
national government, they had no such intention regarding application of the clauses to
the states except that they were not intended to apply to the states.
Id. at 267-68.
495. Levy stated that Madison's view, which Levy claims to be strict separation, "was widely
shared by the other framers of the Constitution." LEVY, supra note 9, at 119. This conflicts with
Adams's and Emmerich's position that the Founders (including the Framers) shared a wide variety
of views; Madison's and Jefferson's did not predominate. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at
26. For a discussion of the personalities of the Framers, see Frederick M. Gedicks, The Rise and
Fall of the Religion Clauses, 6 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 499 (1992).
496. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 26. Consider in this vein Benjamin Franklin,
who, although better known for other endeavors, played an important role in the early formation
of the United States, and deserves mention here. Franklin, a Framer at the Constitutional Conven-
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Washington exemplified this description. As President he proclaimed a
national day of thanksgiving for the people to acknowledge "that great and
glorious Being for the civil and religious liberty with which we are
blessed."497 The following reply to the Jewish Congregation of Newport fur-
ther indicates both his great respect for religion and his enthusiasm for reli-
gious freedom: "It is now no more that toleration is spoken of, as if it was by
the indulgence of one class of people, that another enjoyed the exercise of
their inherent natural rights." 98 While in office, Washington also effected a
treaty in which the United States paid one thousand dollars to build a
church.4' This action, more than any other of Washington's Presidential ten-
ure, is inapposite separationism. If as separationists contend, any governmental
regulation respecting religion is prohibited, then Congress violated the First
Amendment three years after it became effective.5" Moreover, while Wash-
ington was an unavowed advocate of religious freedom and toleration, his
actions, particularly his proclamations, indicate he did not believe the Constitu-
tion precluded all federal government action with respect to religion. To this
end, consider the following remarks delivered at his farewell address:
[L]et us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be
maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influ-
ence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and
experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail
in exclusion of religious principle."'
Hence, while Washington certainly was not supportive of a national church or
establishment or preferential treatment for any one sect, he likely believed that
national encouragement of religious practice both was necessary and permitted
to preserve social order and maintain the moral good. °2
Other prominent figures shared Washington's convictions. John Adams,
for example, not only continued Washington's practice of declaring days of
tion in 1787, was bothered by the slow progress of the group. He stated:
I have lived, Sir, a long time, and the longer I live, the more convincing proofs I
see of this truth-that God Governs in the affairs of men. And if a sparrow cannot fall
to the ground without his notice, is it probable that an empire cannot rise without his
aid? We have been assured, Sir, in the sacred writings, that "except the Lord build the
House they labor in vain that build it." I firmly believe this ....
I therefore beg leave to move-that henceforth prayers imploring the assistance
of Heaven, and its blessings on our deliberations, be held in this Assembly every morn-
ing before we proceed to business, and that one or more of the Clergy of this City be
requested to officiate in that Service.
CORD, supra note 8, at 24-25. Although the motion was seconded, no vote was ever taken on it
because of fear expressed by others that although such a motion might have been proper at the
beginning of the Convention, if it was not adopted, the public might perceive that the Conven-
tion's troubles were so great as to resort only to divine assistance. See id. at 25.
497. CORD, supra note 8, at 26.
498. Id. at 27.
499. Id. at 58.
500. Id.
501. George Washington, Farewell Address, 1796, in ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at
21.
502. See, e.g., id. ("He believed that 'Religion and Morality are the essential pillars of Civil
society' and affirmed that everyone should be 'protected in worshipping the Deity according to the
dictates of their consciences."').
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Thanksgiving, but declared two national fast days to allow for the "promotion
of that morality and piety without which social happiness can not exist nor the
blessings of a free government be enjoyed."5"3 Chief Justice John Marshall
admitted that "[liegislation on the subject [religion] is admitted to require great
delicacy, because freedom of conscience and respect for our religion both
claim our most serious regard."5"4 By using the term legislation, Marshall
implicitly rejected a broad construction of the Establishment Clause because
separationism by definition precludes legislation.
Consider also Justice Joseph Story, Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court from 1811 to 1845, who in his treatise on the Constitution said the
following with regard to religion:
The real difficulty lies in ascertaining the limits to which government
may rightfully go in fostering and encouraging religion. The real
object of the First Amendment was.., to exclude all rivalry among
Christian sects, and to prevent any national ecclesiastical establish-
ment which should give to a hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the
national government.0 5
These statements presuppose that the Constitution permits the federal govern-
ment, within prescribed limits, to use legislation to foster or encourage reli-
gion."°
To be sure, one cannot categorically characterize the Framers or Founders
collectively as strict-separationist or nonpreferentialist. It is instead both more
accurate and more reasonable to depict, as the evidence suggests, that the
Framers' views on church and state fell along a continuum which spans these
two extremes. 7 The Supreme Court has, unfortunately, relied exclusively on
the separationist writings of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson when con-
sidering Establishment Clause disputes. The Court has reduced the Establish-
ment Clause to nothing more than the collective intent of those two figures. In
any event, the Court's long held view, first proffered in Everson, that the
Framers' intent was indisputably separationist is historically baseless and inac-
curate.
D. Federalism and the Problem with Incorporation
As evidenced by the preceding case discussion, virtually every Establish-
ment Clause case involves disputes between individuals and state or local
503. Id. at 27.
504. Id. at 28. Marshall further stated: "The American population is entirely Christian and
with us, Christianity and Religion are identified. It would be strange indeed, if with such a people,
our institutions did not presuppose Christianity, and did not often refer to it, and exhibit relations
with it." Id. Although few would argue that the modem United States is as religiously homoge-
neous as when Marshall made his statement, his characterization demonstrates that not all Framers
thought the Constitution prohibited the national government from interacting with religion and re-
ligious institutions.
505. CORD, supra note 8, at 13.
506. For an argument that Story's views never led anywhere and were in effect meaningless,
see MORGAN, supra note 76, at 40.
507. See ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 22.
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governmental bodies. Only a scant few involve actions by the national govem-
ment. Moreover, the entire jurisprudential area is relatively young, dating back
only to 1947 and the Everson decision. In fact, Everson was the first substan-
tive Establishment Clause case heard by the Supreme Court, despite the fact
that the Clause had been in place for over 150 years. During this period, it
was the state governments, rather than the federal government, which exer-
cised control over religious legislation. It was only when the Establishment
Clause was incorporated in Everson that the Clause's mandates became bind-
ing upon the states via the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The
Court's decision to fully incorporate the Establishment Clause has proved to
be a poor one.5" Mountains of litigation have resulted, and problems which
were previously resolved on a state and local level are now being decided by
various branches of the federal government which are insensitive to local
preferences, cultures, and problems."° More fundamental difficulties which
plague the Establishment Clause's incorporation are its lack of historical sup-
port and its rebuke of the federalism upon which its passage was based.
In short, any understanding of the Establishment Clause must be based on
an understanding of federalism. Federalism essentially mandates that the feder-
al government is one of enumerated powers, and that it may not, theoretically,
and consistent with the Constitution, take any actions not specifically and
explicitly authorized by the Constitution's text.5" ° This incontrovertible view
of federalism with respect to the Establishment Clause persisted for over 150
years, during which time the Supreme Court twice condoned it: first in Barron
v. Baltimore,"' later in Permoli v. New Orleans."' Those in favor of
508. Others agree. For example:
[C]onfusing case law has led the Justices themselves to describe their Establishment
Clause doctrine as a muddle that lacks clear principles and departs from the intent of the
Framers. Some commentators have argued that this doctrinal confusion was the inevi-
table consequence of the Court's decision to incorporate the Establishment Clause
against the states in spite of the intent of the Framers of the First Amendment.
Note, supra note 78, at 1702.
509. One commentator states that
perhaps the most important value to be served by restoring state authority over religion
would be the federalist value of decentralized decisionmaking. This method of political
organization confers two principal benefits. First, states and localities can better respond
to the needs and interests of the majority of their citizens than the national government
because they can tailor their laws to suit local conditions and preferences.
Id. at 1715.
510. Given these restricted federal powers, Madison and many other Framers felt a bill of
rights unnecessary. LEVY, supra note 9, at 125. Because the Constitution did not grant Congress
any power to legislate with respect to religion, speech, etc., the populace, at least theoretically, had
no reason to fear federal usurpation of state power. Rather, Madison believed that neither the
Constitution nor explicit guarantees would assure religious liberty. Instead, he declared that it was
a multiplicity of sects, i.e., religious pluralism, that protected and secured religious liberty. Id.
With numerous sects, one sect would be less likely to accumulate sufficient power to oppress the
others. Id.
511. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
512. 44 U.S. (I How.) 589 (1845). In addressing the New Orleans ordinance in Permoli, the
Court stated, "There is no repugnancy to the constitution, because no provision thereof forbids the
enactment of law or ordinance, under state authority, in reference to religion. The limitation of
power in the first amendment of the Constitution is upon Congress, and not the states." Permoli,
44 U.S. (I How.) at 606.
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extending the Establishment Clause's provisions to the states, however, found
their fortune in the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits states from de-
priving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
With respect to the Establishment Clause, the critical issue thus became
whether state legislation respecting an establishment of religion constituted a
deprivation of liberty.'
1 3
There can be no doubt that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did
not intend its liberty component to embody the Establishment Clause re-
straints."3 4 The proposed Blaine Amendment confirms this. In 1875, just sev-
en years after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Representative
James G. Blaine sought approval of an amendment stating that, "No state shall
make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof." ' This language, of course, correlates exactly with that in
the Religion Clauses, which constrain only Congress. Although the amendment
passed, it lacked the necessary two-thirds majority for submission to the
states.5 6 Its mere introduction, however, to a Congress which included twen-
ty three members of the Congress which drafted the Fourteenth Amendment,
illustrates undeniably that those who framed of the Fourteenth Amendment did
not intend it to apply the Establishment Clause to the states. In short, had the
Congress believed the Fourteenth Amendment encompassed the Establishment
Clause, there would have been no need to affix to the Constitution a redundant
amendment encompassing the Religion Clauses.
As it turned out, however, the Supreme Court ignored this intent, and in
1947 held in Everson that the Establishment Clause applied to the states via
the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 The incorporation process began, however, at
least seven years before in Cantwell v. Connecticut."3 8 There, the Court said:
The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth)
Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment. The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the states as incom-
petent as Congress to enact such laws." 9
With these words, the Court cast the die that led to the Establishment Clause's
incorporation seven years later.
In the abstract, few would argue that the mandates of the First Amend-
ment should not apply to the states as well as Congress. Indeed, free speech
and free exercise of religion are two notions undoubtedly fundamental to the
concept of ordered liberty. Yet some sense an inherent distinction between free
513. See LEVY, supra note 9, at 148.
514. Indeed, the evidence suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment was not designed to incor-
porate any provisions embodied in the Bill of Rights. See Alfred W. Meyer, The Blaine
Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 64 HARV. L. REV. 939, 945 (1951).
515. Id. at 941.
516. Id. at 944.
517. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
518. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
519. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303.
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speech and free exercise and the establishment of religion.52 These scholars
assert that the Establishment Clause, unlike the other First Amendment claus-
es, does not protect individual freedoms or grant a right to engage in some
specific action.52" ' In short, because establishment of religion need not neces-
sarily restrict an individual's free exercise rights, ordered liberty can exist in
the absence of Establishment Clause incorporation. 22 As one commentator
notes, however, Madison, Jefferson, and several preeminent religious founders
believed prevention of establishment essential to freedom. 23 To the extent
that this encompasses only formal establishments, I agree. But incorporating
the Establishment Clause and interpreting it to prohibit states from
nonpreferentially fostering and encouraging religion is inapposite to the First
Amendment, which by its terms reserved religion for the states. Indeed, per-
mitting states to make informed public policy decisions as to whether to en-
courage religion through nonpreferential means in no way detracts from any
plausible notion of liberty. 2 '
The federalist nature of the First Amendment theoretically renders the
national government incapable of legislating, even nonpreferentially, with
respect to religion. Yet that same Amendment theoretically preserves for the
states legislative dominion over religion. Hence, the Court has disrupted the
delicate balance of power intended by the Framers. The result is that the Court
has proscribed every governmental body-local, state, and national-from
enacting nonpreferential legislation on religious topics.525
As a feasible compromise, incorporation of the Establishment Clause
should apply to the states only to the extent that it prohibits them from creat-
ing formal establishments and enacting religious legislation which exalts one
religion or religious sects over others. The sensitive choice as to whether it
520. One commentator noted:
The Framers intended the Establishment Clause to embody a principle of federalism.
That is, the original purpose of the Clause was to prevent Congress from interfering with
the variety of church-state relationships that existed in 1791. For this reason, the Estab-
lishment Clause was a uniquely poor candidate for incorporation against the states.
Note, supra note 78, at 1700.
521. See LEVY, supra note 9, at 228.
522. Id.
523. Id.
524. Indeed, states should today possess this right to protect religions. Unlike 200 years ago,
as one author notes, "The great problem today is not the threat that religion poses to public life,
but the threat that the state, presuming to embody public life, poses to religion." Richard J.
Neuhaus, A New Order of Religious Freedom, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 620, 632 (1992).
525. Others share this view. Consider the remarks of one commentator:
In particular, since the incorporation of those clauses, the Court has infused its decisions
with considerations of original intent and history that have the effect of misinterpreting
the meaning of the Religion Clauses as they are applied to the states. The result ... has
been the alteration of the basic structure of those clauses; what began as a limitation of
federal power designed to promote government regulation of religion at the state level, if
there was to be any regulation of religion at all, has been turned upside down so that
today the dominant force shaping church-state relations are the federal courts in general
and the Supreme Court in particular. [Tlhe Court has failed to heed the belief of the
founders that civil authority in religious matters, to the extent it could be exercised, was
a state function.
Poppel, supra note 416, at 249.
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wishes to expend valuable resources to foster, aid, or encourage526 religion
should rest with a state and its citizens."' Unlike the Supreme Court's ap-
proach, which was to fully incorporate and apply to the states the Establish-
ment Clause and then spend two decades creating a historically unsupported
and undoubtedly unworkable standard, this modified incorporation framework
is consistent with both history and the Framers' intent. Indeed, as one com-
mentator notes:
[T]he only consensus among the Framers of the First Amendment
about the appropriate relationship between church and state was to
allow the states to decide the issue themselves. Thus, the only theory
of the Establishment Clause that accurately captures the collective
intent of the Framers and reflects their divergent views is federal-
ism 528i . 2
VII. CONCLUSION
Modem Supreme Court Establishment Clause jurisprudence is based on
both misinterpreted history and unfounded historical assumptions. Indeed,
despite the wishes of Scalia or Souter, the Framers cannot be classified as
either nonpreferentialist or strict-separationist. Rather, the history of the Estab-
lishment Clause demonstrates that no one philosophy emerged which clearly
represented the entire group's beliefs. Moreover, the Supreme Court's incorpo-
ration of the Establishment Clause rendered the use of Framers' intent to
526. Encouragement of religion does not consist of prayer in schools or Bible reading in
schools, but rather tax exemptions for parents who send their children to private religious schools,
use of public school buses for sectarian school students to go on secular field trips, and teaching
various religious (and nonreligious) approaches to morality in the public school system.
527. To this end, I do not advocate overturning the incorporation doctrine in its entirety,
rather just a shift in its jurisprudential focus which reflects more Court respect for state rights and
local decisions. Few are so naive as to faithfully, and foolishly, propose that the Court abolish the
incorporation doctrine. However, the Court "might reinterpret precedents, distinguishing away
some, blunting others, and making new law without the appearance of overruling or disrespecting
the past." LEVY, supra note 9, at 232.
528. Note, supra note 78, at 1705. One commentator offers a compelling point in this respect
it is almost inconceivable that the Supreme Court will abandon the incorporation doctrine, and
highly unlikely that it would ever modify the incorporation doctrine sufficiently to solve the prob-
lems currently facing it. As such, modem scholars are essentially avoiding the issue, which can be
stated as follows:
[Elven scholars who have criticized the incorporation of the establishment clause have
typically assumed that the clause continues to restrict the national government, as it was
originally intended to do. But even that assumption seems unwarranted. If the religion
clauses were an allocation of jurisdiction over religion to the states, and if that allocation
has to be undone, then there is no justification-no originalist justification grounded in
the First Amendment's religion clauses, at least-for holding even the national govern-
ment to restrictions grounded in a jurisdictional arrangement that has long since been
repudiated.
More generally, the effort to develop an authoritative constitutional law of reli-
gious freedom based on the religion clauses of the First Amendment is in a sense similar
to an effort to discuss the states' current constitutional authority to permit or regulate
liquor on the basis of the Eighteenth Amendment, while ignoring the inconvenient fact
that this amendment has been repealed. If there is to be constitutional law on either
subject, it will have to be derived from some other source.
SMITH, supra note 40, at 50.
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analyze state religious legislation inapposite to the Framers' understanding of
the republic. It is like trying to put a round peg in a square hole-something
just does not fit. That something is federalism. In short, it existed in 1789, but
for all practical purposes exists in name only now. Recall that in the Framers'
era, states were free to legislate with respect to religion; they could establish
religions or restrict religious freedom-they were writing on a blank page. In-
corporation, however, disrupted this balance of power. Hence, it is merely
guesswork to suggest that Madison or Jefferson would have approved or dis-
approved of this or that bill. No one knows how any of the Framers would
regard modem religion clause jurisprudence. For sure, most would not even
recognize it as a product of the Constitution and Bill of Rights they created
over 200 years ago. Likewise, most would also consider the federal
government's encroachment into the sphere of state power, with respect to
religion and innumerable other matters, palpable violations of their republican
ideal.
Unfortunately, for nearly fifty years the Court has adhered to an unduly
rigid separationist viewpoint. As a result, modem Courts must fight the temp-
tation, and increasingly the popular demand, to shift too far the other way. The
incorporation model proposed earlier grants states discretion as to whether or
not to aid religion in evenhanded, neutral manners. Such an approach accounts
both for the separationist fear of formal establishments and the
nonpreferentialist appreciation for federalism. Finally, both sides would do
well to recall the words of Chief Justice Rehnquist, who said, "The true mean-
ing of the Establishment Clause can only be seen in its history." '529 In this
respect, nonpreferentialists must recognize the importance of the Establishment
Clause's underlying rationale-to secure the broadest possible level of reli-
gious freedom and protect the sanctity of the church. Similarly, separationists
should heed the warning of John Adams, the nation's second President, who
maintained, "Our Constitution was made only for a moral and religious peo-
ple. It is wholly inadequate to the government of any other."53
John E. Joiner
529. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
530. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 27.
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